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Article
The Millennium Development Goals:
Milestones or Millstones? Human Rights
Priorities for the Post-2015 Development
Agenda
Mac Darrowt
"Not everything that can be counted counts,
and not everything that counts can be counted."
Albert Einstein
INTRODUCTION
In September 2010, world leaders met for the High Level Plenary
Meeting on the Millennium Development Goals ("MDGs Summit"). The
MDGs Summit took place with great fanfare, attracting close to 140 heads
of state and government, as well as leaders from civil society, foundations
and the private sector.' It launched important aid initiatives and generated
unprecedented agreement by Member States on the importance of human
rights in efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals ("MDGs").
t Ph.D. Chief, MDGs Section, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR). The views in this article are expressed in a personal capacity, and are not
necessarily the views of the United Nations or OHCHR. The author is grateful to Alicia Yamin,
Malcolm Langford, John Tobin, Sally-Anne Way, Stephen Humphreys and Varun Gauri for
comments on an earlier draft.
1. Media Advisory, United Nations Department of Public Information, United Nations
Convenes World Leaders to Spur Action Against Poverty: Summit on the Millennium
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But how successful was this event, measured against its goals, and what are
the human rights implications of the MDGs Summit with regard to future
development and aid policy?
Global summits have not enjoyed an easy ride in the court of public
opinion.2 Global summitry has been a veritable industry since the 1990s,
convened at great expense to the international taxpayer, generating (and
recycling) a great wealth of largely pre-scripted and partially implemented
promises to improve the human condition. Global promises are, it has been
noted, "easily set but seldom met." 3 If past global summit commitments
had been achieved, we would all have been healthy by 2000, trade would
be "fair," and twenty-four thousand children would not be dying each day
through poor sanitation and easily preventable causes. 4 Given this track
record of unmet goals, why should the MDGs Summit continue to merit
our attention?
Certain global conferences have enjoyed comparatively strong political
support, have established institutional frameworks for long-term
cooperative action, and, arguably, have contributed positively to global
social progress. 5 The 2000 Millennium Summit6 is especially noteworthy
because in the first half of 2001, to prevent the Millennium Declaration from
lapsing into oblivion, a U.N. inter-agency expert group extracted a small
number of quantifiable human development commitments from the
voluminous body of the Millennium Declaration, and established a global
campaign and international monitoring regime under the auspices of the
U.N. 7 These goals (the MDGs) encapsulate an important subset of
internationally recognised socio-economic rights and set global targets from
the baseline year of 1990 to (for the most part) a 2015 end date. While a
global assessment of their impact is premature, the MDGs have
undoubtedly raised the profile and popular awareness of development
2. See, e.g., JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, RED SKY AT MORNING: AMERICA AND THE CRISIS OF THE
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 8-9 (2004); Bill Jamieson, Global Summitry Exposed for the Sham it Plainly
Is, SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY, July 22, 2001; Cf. Richard Jolly, The MDGs in Historical Perspective, 41
IDS BULLETIN 48 (2010) (arguing that there has been more progress in implementing global
development goals than is commonly recognised).
3. Jan Vandemoortele, Millennium Development Goals: Looking Beyond the Averages, OECD
OBSERVER (Aug. 2002), http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/ 7 68 /
MillenniumDevelopmentGoals:Looking-beyond the averages.html.
4. Declaration of Alma-Ata, International Conference on Primary Health Care, Alma-Ata,
USSR, Sept. 6-12, 1978, 1 V; World Declaration on the Survival, Protection and Development of
Children, World Summit for Children, New York, Sept. 29-30, 1990, 1 20; United Nations
Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/Res/55/2 (2000) (Sept 18, 2000), 13.
5. Jolly, supra note 2, at 48-49. See also S. Jacob Scherr & R. Juge Gregg, Johannesburg and
Beyond: The 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development and the Rise of Partnerships, 18 GEO. J.
INT'L ENVTL L. REV. 425, 439-46, 460-63 (2006) (discussing the contributions of the 2002 World
Summit on Sustainable Development to a global partnership approach to global
environmental problems).
6. The outcome document of the Millennium Summit was the Millennium Declaration,
which contains a raft of commitments on development, peace and security, human rights and
humanitarian action. Supra note 4.
7. UNITED NATIONS MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS,
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
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issues, changed the terms of international development policy, and helped
to bring a stronger focus to neglected social rights, such as the right to food,
education and health.
The key premise of this paper is to show that the agreed upon global
summit commitments are alone insufficient; equally if not more important
for progress is sustained political mobilisation and innovative use of the
commitments. This paper begins with a short history of the MDGs
initiative, along with an appraisal of its significance. A short analysis of the
process and outcomes of the MDGs Summit follows, evaluated through the
prism of human rights. The purpose is not to undertake a cost-benefit
analysis of the MDGs Summit for its own sake. Rather, the purpose is to
sharpen and strengthen arguments for integrating human rights in national
MDG-based development planning, and to position human rights more
clearly and strategically in policy debates for the post-2015 development
agenda.
II. THE MDGs THROUGH A HUMAN RIGHTS LENS
This Section begins with a short review of the historical origins of the
MDGs and their significance for development policy and financing. It then
examines some of the more pertinent human rights critiques, leading into
an appraisal of the significance of the MDGs Summit outcomes. Afterward,
priorities and proposals for the post-2015 development agenda are
discussed.
A. History and Significance of the MDGs
The MDGs comprise eight time-bound, measurable human
development goals, with eighteen globally agreed targets and forty-eight
indicators.8 Examples include: (1) between 1990 and 2015, halving the
proportion of people suffering hunger and living on less than USD1 per
day; (2) achieving universal primary education; (3) halting and beginning to
reverse HIV/AIDS by 2015; and (4) reducing by three-quarters the maternal
mortality ratio. Significantly, in MDG 8, donor countries agreed to a
number of commitments in connection with aid, trade, debt relief, access to
essential medicines and technology transfer. 9 The inclusion of donor
8. Id.
9. Target 8.A is to "[dievelop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory
trading and financial system." Target 8.B is to "[alddress the needs of the least developed
countries," through such measures as tariff free and quota free access for least developed
countries' exports, expanding debt relief and cancelling official bilateral debt, and "more
generous ODA [Official Development Assistancel for countries committed to poverty
reduction." Target 8.C addresses the "special needs of landlocked developing countries and
small island developing States." Target 8.D deals with debt sustainability, Target 8.E seeks to
ensure access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries, and Target 8.F deals with
the availability of information and communications technology. The only other targets without
dates are Target 1.8 on achieving full and productive employment and decent work for all,
Target 7.A on integrating the principles of sustainable development into country policies and
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commitments in this global compact for poverty reduction helps to explain
why the MDGs have attracted broader support than their predecessor, the
"International Development Goals" produced by the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in the 1990s.10 Secluded
from public view in the months following the MDG Summit, the architects
of the MDGs could scarcely have imagined their eventual impact on the
global development discourse, if not development policy on the ground.
The MDGs bring a number of advantages to development work, and
indirectly also to human rights. Notably, the MDGs embody a wide
international consensus, and provide a framework for mobilising resources
to help realise a small but significant number of socio-economic rights. The
manageable scope and quantifiable character of the MDGs theoretically
makes them amenable to "costing" at the national level, which in turn
facilitates analysis of the "fiscal space" and resources required for their
realisation, including through official development assistance (ODA),"
where domestic resource constraints so require. At least implicitly, in these
respects, the MDGs challenge "Washington Consensus" economic policies
and ideologically-driven fiscal conservatism, 12 which have imposed
unwarranted constraints on domestic policy space and budgets for social
spending in many poorer countries. 1 3
The MDGs harness the power of numbers to provide a framework for
evidence-based policymaking and the power of simple ideas to mobilise
public opinion. This is supported by a global Millennium Campaign. The
MDGs provide global benchmarks for accountability, and facilitate cross-
country comparisons of human progress. Some have claimed the MDGs
have improved data collection, statistical methods and monitoring of
important attributes of human well being beyond crude surrogates such as
per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP).14 Some have also claimed the
MDGs have facilitated cross-sector collaboration in development work.15
programmes, and Targets 5.A and 5.B on maternal health.
10. OECD Development Assistance Committee, Shaping the 21st Century: the
Contribution of Development Cooperation 8-11 (May 1996) available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/35/2508761.pdf.
11. ODA refers to official aid undertaken with the promotion of economic development
and welfare as the main objective on concessional financing terms. For a full definition see
OECD, Glossary of Statistical Terms, available at
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6043.
12. In 1989, the economist John Williamson christened the "Washington Consensus," a set
of economic policy reforms for developing countries. This 10-point policy checklist advocated
fiscal and monetary soundness, openness to trade and investment, financial liberalization and
regulation, privatization, deregulation and secure property rights. See Moises Naim, Fads and
Fashion in Economic Reforms: Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion? 21 THIRD WORLD
Q. 505, 505 & n.1 (2000) (citing to LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: How MUCH HAS HAPPENED
(John Williamson ed., 1990)).
13. See Naim, supra note 12 (criticising the conceptualisation and implementation of this
policy package).
14. Jan Vandemoortele, If Not the Millennium Development Goals, then What? 32 THIRD
WORLD Q. 9,10-11 (2011).
15. Id.; Jan Vandemoortele & Enrique Delamonica, Taking the MDGs Beyond 2015: Hasten
Slowly, 41 IDS BULLETIN 60 (2010). Contra Lancet & London International Development Centre,
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Perhaps more controversially, the MDGs have also been credited as the
catalyst for increased pro-poor public expenditure, debt cancellation in over
thirty countries, steady increases in aid levels, improvements in child
mortality, education enrollments, and representation of women in
parliament, and helping nearly half a billion people escape "dollar-a-day"
poverty.' 6 As to their normative attributes, it has also been argued that the
MDGs - interpreted in line with other international declarations and world
summit outcomes - have strengthened the claims of certain socioeconomic
rights as binding norms of customary international law.17
Some claim that high among the MDGs' virtues are their simplicity,
statistical rigour, and feasibility.18 In principle, a relatively small list of
human development goals more readily mobilises public opinion and
political action than a lengthy list. With a number of notable exceptions, as
will be demonstrated later in this paper, the issues included in most MDGs
are clear, and have solid indicators with robust data sets at the national
level with which to facilitate monitoring. This serves to reduce
interpretation bias. The "feasibility" of the MDGs is said to draw from the
fact that the (usually) 2015 endpoint for the various goals is defined by
reference to the rate of progress that actually occurred between 1965 and
1990.19 In other words, the operative assumption is that if the world was
able to achieve aggregate progress at a certain rate between 1965 and 1990,
continued progress at the same rate through to 2015 should be "feasible."
B. Human Rights Critiques of the MDGs
Notwithstanding the suggested benefits outlined above, not everybody
sees the MDGs as an unalloyed boon for human development, let alone
human rights. Derided by their most ardent detractors as "Major
Distracting Gimmicks," critics of the MDGs have pointed to the secretive
circumstances of their birth, their technocratic and reductionist nature, their
The Millennium Development Goals: A Cross-Sectoral Analysis and Principles for Goal-Setting After
2015, 376 LANCET 991 (2010) (arguing that the fragmented nature of the MDGs and their
corresponding targets has encouraged vertical organisation of service delivery and limited the
scope for policy coherence and operational synergies).
16. Salil Shetty, Countdown 2015: Accelerating Progress on the MDGs, Presentation,
Stockholm, Sweden (Mar. 24, 2010). However Shetty also observes that political will is the
most valuable commodity of all, noting that financial bailouts in 2009 totalled USD 18 trillion,
whereas total aid given in the last 49 years has been less than USD 2 trillion. Id. For more
qualified assessments of the impacts of the MDGs, suggesting that impact is more evident in
re-framing development discourse than in mobilising resources in donor and developing
countries, see Richard Manning, The Impact and Design of the MDGs: Some Reflections, 41 IDS
BULLETIN 7 (2010); see also Andy Sumner & Claire Melamed, Introduction - The MDGs and
Beyond: Pro-Poor Policy in a Changing World, 41 IDS BULLETIN 1, 2-3 (2010) (noting the
methodological difficulties of proving and attributing positive impacts to the MDGs).
17. Philip Alston, Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights and
Development Debate Seen Through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals, 27 HUM. RTS. Q.
755, 771-75 (2005).
18. Vandemoortele, supra note 14, at 10-12, 14-16.
19. Jan Vandemoortele, MDGs: Misunderstood Targets? INTERNATIONAL POVERTY CENTRE,
One Pager No. 28, at 762 (2007) (outlining various critiques of the MDGs).
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lack of ambition, their failure to address root causes of poverty, their failure
to factor in legal obligations pertaining to social rights, their gender-
blindness, their failure to address poverty in rich countries, their weak
accountability mechanisms, their limited uptake by social movements in the
Global South, the potentially distorting character of target-driven
policymaking, and the propensity of the MDGs to "crowd out" attention to
important issues that didn't make it into the global list, for example, social
security or social protection. 20
These critiques are relatively well rehearsed, however there are a
number of trenchant problems that deserve particular attention when
considering the lessons to be drawn for the post-2015 development agenda.
These are: tensions between MDG progress and authoritarian governance;
procedural and legitimacy concerns; problems relating to poor
specification; inappropriate scale of ambition based upon unreliable and
arbitrary assumptions about feasibility; misinterpretation and
misapplication of the MDGs at the national level; the failure to address
growing inequalities; tensions with international human rights legal
standards; and colonisation of the MDGs by economic growth and aid
lobbies.
1. The MDGs can provide a fig leaf for authoritarian regimes
Recent events in the Middle East, and what has become known as the
Arab Spring, have put into sharp relief the uncomfortable juxtaposition
between MDG achievement and authoritarian governance in various parts
of the world. Tunisia, for example, was an international poster-child of the
MDGs, right up until its revolution of early 2011.21 This is not a mere
20. See, e.g., Alston, supra note 17; OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, CLAIMING THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: A HUMAN RIGHTS
APPROACH, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/07/3 (2008) (hereinafter "Claiming the MDGs"); SEPARATE
PATHS? MDGs AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (Malcolm Langford, Andy
Sumner & Alicia Yamin eds., forthcoming 2012); Ashwani Saith, From Universal Values to
Millennium Development Goals: Lost in Translation, 37 DEV. & CHANGE 1167 (2006); Paul J.
Nelson, Human Rights, the Millennium Development Goals, and the Future of Development
Cooperation, 35 WORLD DEV. 2041 (2007); Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Are the MDGs Priority in
Development Strategies and Aid Programmes? Only Few Are! INT. POVERTY CENTRE, WORKING
PAPER No. 48 (2008); Thomas Pogge, Global Justice and the First U.N. Millennium
Development Goal, Evening Address at the University of Oslo Global Justice Symposium
(2003), available at www.etikk.no/globaljustice; Peggy Antrobus, Gender Equality in the New
Millennium: Goal or Gimmick? ISIS INT'L (May 3, 2007); PAUL NELSON & ELLEN DORSEY, NEW
RIGHTS ADVOCACY: CHANGING STRATEGIES OF DEVELOPMENT NGOS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(2008).
21. According to the UNDP, Tunisia was the 7th fastest mover on the "Human
Development Index" (HDI; a composite measure of education, health and income indicators)
in 2010. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010: THE
REAL WEALTH OF NATIONS, at 3, 29, 47 (2010) (hereinafter HDR 2010). However, the UNDP
noted problems of inequality and lack of political freedom. Id. at 54, 69. MDGs "success
stories" showcased at the September 2010 MDGs Summit included Ethiopia and Rwanda,
whose MDGs achievements (which in Rwanda's case include the world's highest
representation of women in Parliament, a notable achievement indeed, see id. at 91) sit
uncomfortably with broad human rights critiques emerging through the Human Rights
60 [Vol. 15
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problem of appearances. While no country has a clean human rights slate,
lavishing praise where it is not due offers a fig leaf of legitimacy to
authoritarian regimes, masks underlying inequalities and structural
discrimination and oppression, and de-oxygenates local emancipatory
struggles. Of course, one could argue that the democratic movements in
Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere may not have taken root without the
education (including girls' and women's education) and health gains
achieved with the support of resources and incentives associated with the
MDGs campaign. But this is a weak palliative without proper analysis of
the complex counterfactuals and claims of the rights-holders themselves,
and without considering how modest revisions to the MDGs framework as
proposed further below might correct such biases.
2. The MDGs emerged from a faulty process and are poorly specified
Substantive deficiencies in the MDGs have been widely remarked
upon, and certain of these will be elaborated further below. These, to some
extent, are linked to the process that brought them into being. The lawyer-
poet John Godrey Saxe, in a quote popularised by Otto von Bismarck,
remarked: "Laws, like sausages, cease to inspire respect in proportion as we
know how they are made." 22 A similar comment might pertain to the
MDGs, hatched behind closed doors and shaped by special interests and
the proclivities of particular development agencies as much as by any
coherent conceptual design or consistently rigorous statistical parameters.23
The problem of poor specification is perhaps most notorious in
connection with the income poverty target in MDG 1. Target 1.A commits
states to "halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose
Council's Universal Periodic Review process. See Universal Periodic Review,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/ PAGES/ ETSession6.aspx (Ethiopia, 6th session,
2009) and http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/PAGES/RWSessionl0.aspx (Rwanda,
10th session, 2011), respectively. See also Amnesty International, The State of the World's Human
Rights (2011) at 140-42 (Ethiopia), 274-76 (Rwanda), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/POL10/001/2011/en/519da03 7 -14 9 2 -4 6 20 -9 ed5-
cac8flcfd591/pol100012011en.pdf. These two countries are also among the lowest ranking
countries on UNDP's inequality adjusted HDI "empowerment" table (a composite measure of
agency, accountability, and certain political freedoms and civil liberties) and
"Multidimensional Poverty Index" (MPI). The MPI measures ten indicators in three
dimensions of human development (health, education and living standards), beyond income
poverty. Critically, the MPI index captures not only the share of people who are
"multidimensionally poor" but also the intensity of their poverty. See HDR 2010 at 95-97, 154,
163, 167.
22. Fred R. Shapiro, Quote . . . Misquote, N.Y. TIMEs MAGAZINE (July 21, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/21/magazine/27wwwl-guestsafire-t.html? r=1 (sourcing
the quote to the March 29, 1869 edition of the Daily Cleveland Herald).
23. William Easterly, Was Africa Set Up to Fail on the Millennium Development Goals?
AIDWATCH (June 1, 2010), http://aidwatchers.com/2010/06/was-africa-set-up-to-fail-on-the-
millennium-development-goals/, (noting the different methodological approaches to
measuring various MDG targets, and the different consequences that this may have in terms of
how progress (or the lack of it) is characterised, depending upon a given country's starting
point and resource constraints); see also Vandemoortele & Delamonica, supra note 15, at 61-62.
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income is less than one dollar a day." Income is clearly a crude poverty
measure, and states are expected to monitor poverty by reference to
national poverty lines that more capture aspects of multi-dimensional
poverty. 24  Whether national poverty lines are consistent with
internationally recognized human rights standards depends on a number of
factors including whether they: (a) capture relevant dimensions of the right
to an adequate standard of living; (b) reflect the depth and severity (rather
than just the incidence) of poverty; (c) are disaggregated to capture the
grounds of discrimination prohibited under human rights treaties; (d)
include indicators for monitoring important poverty-reducing policies (in
addition to MDG indicators which typically monitor the outcomes of policy
measures); and (e) are sufficiently ambitious.? The poor specification of
Target 1.A has permitted a wide range of subjective interpretations,
justifying a dramatic upward revision of headcount poverty estimates by
the World Bank in 2008 at the same time that researchers elsewhere
concluded that Sub-Saharan Africa's progress towards Target 1.A was on
track.26 Clearer specification would reduce the range of such wildly
different interpretations.
3. The definition of "feasible" progress is arbitrary and unambitious
Other methodological ambiguities are equally troubling, relating to the
baseline year for the MDGs and the assumptions underpinning their
desired level of ambition. Target L.A is, again, illustrative. It is a little
known fact, outside the MDGs cognoscenti, that Target 1.A was preceded by
a more ambitious pledge at the 1996 World Food Summit in Rome, to
"halve the number [rather than proportion] of extremely poor people
between 1996 [rather than 1990] and 2015."The reformulation of this pledge
in Target 1.A, referring to "proportion" rather than absolute numerical
reduction, and moving the baseline year back to 1990 from 1996, were not
matters of mere semantics. First, a proportionate, rather than absolute,
reduction is less ambitious given the effects of population growth. As
Thomas Pogge explains: "[Tlhe proportion of extremely poor people is a
fraction that has the number of extremely poor people in the numerator and
some reference population in the denominator. A fixed reduction in the
value of such a fraction, here by one-half, can come about through a
decrease in the numerator and/or through an increase in the denominator.
The greater the increase in the denominator, which occurs simply through
24. For useful discussions on the methods to establish national poverty lines see Martin
Ravallion, Poverty Lines in Theory and Practice, World Bank Living Standards Measurement
Study, Working Paper No. 133 (2008); DEFINING POVERTY IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (Frances
Stewart, Ruhi Saith & Barbara Harriss-White eds., 2007); and UNDP's MPI, supra note 21.
25. Edward Anderson & Andy McKay, Human rights, the MDG income poverty target
and economic growth, Background Paper prepared for the OHCHR Study, Global Analytical
Survey of MDG reports and MDG-related strategies from a human rights perspective, 2009 at
3-5 (on file with author).
26. Jan Vandemoortele, Do the MDGs Really Need More Targets on Human Rights, in
Langford et al., eds., supra note 20.
62 [Vol. 15
8
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 15 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol15/iss1/3
The Millennium Development Goals
population growth, the less of a reduction needs to be achieved in the
numerator." 27
Second, moving the baseline back to 1990 makes it legitimate to
measure the effects of income poverty reduction in China between 1990-
1996, making the goal more achievable. Yet, China's large reduction was
based upon strong growth performance and public policies that self-
evidently preceded and had nothing to do with the MDGs. With these
factors in view, Pogge argues that the recalibrated MDG Target L.A, if
fulfilled, would reduce the number of extremely poor people by only
twenty per cent between 1996 and 2015, compared with the target of a fifty
per cent reduction under the 1996 World Food Summit. By lowering the
MDG L.A bar, the number of extremely poor people deemed morally
acceptable in 2015 rises by 496 million (from 828 to 1,324 million) and
shrinks by more than half (from 828 to 332 million) the reduction pledged
in 1996. The result, in Pogge's assessment, is an additional six million
morally acceptable deaths from poverty-related causes annually.28
A further illustration of the feasibility concern, beyond Target L.A, is
MDG 5 on maternal health, which is the goal least likely to be met in global
terms. Maternal deaths occur on a shocking scale in many countries, from
200 to over 1,000 deaths per 100,000 live births in various areas of Africa
and South, East and Central Asia on best available estimates. This is largely
preventable and occurs due to deeply ingrained discrimination, although
rarely is adequate and disaggregated data collected or are deaths
investigated.29 MDG Target 5.A ("reduce by three quarters, between 1990-
2015, the maternal mortality ratio") is more ambitious than most of the
other MDGs 1 to 7, as a three-quarters reduction would constitute more
rapid progress than was achieved between 1960 to 1990. For this reason,
MDG Target 5.A has been criticised in some quarters for its over-ambition
(in departing from the presumptively "feasible" line of progress between
1960 and 1990),30 at the same time as the U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights has criticised its lack of ambition, arguing, in line with the
logic of Pogge's critique of Target 1.A, that most maternal deaths are easily
avoidable and that even if Target 5.A were met 125,000 women and girls
will still have died needlessly.3 '
27. Thomas Pogge, The First United Nations Millennium Development Goal: A Cause for
Celebration? 5 J. HUM. DEv. 377,383 (2004).
28. Id. at 377-82, 389-90; Thomas Pogge, Millions Killed by Clever Dilution of Our Promise,
CROP POVERTY BRIEF 2-3 (2010), available at www.crop.org/viewfile.aspx?id=218. Pogge's
calculations are based upon the assumption, drawn from WHO and UNDP data, that thirty
percent of all human deaths are caused by poverty-related causes such as starvation, diarrhea,
tuberculosis and other preventable diseases.
29. Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on
Preventable Maternal Mortality and Morbidity and Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/39
(Apr. 16, 2010).
30. Vandemoortele, supra note 14, at 14.
31. Navanethem Pillay, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Statement at the
Millennium Development Goals Review Summit September 2010: "Women at the Centre of
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The foregoing critiques of Targets L.A and 5.A reveal the potentially
momentous moral implications of ostensibly technical and statistical
assumptions and methodological choices, given a certain minimum will to
translate policy commitments into action. Tensions between ambition and
feasibility, or principle and pragmatism, underpin many of the human
rights critiques of the MDGs. An assessment of compliance with socio-
economic rights obligations under the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)32 calls for an objective assessment of
the adequacy, or in some national jurisdictions, the "reasonableness," of a
government's fiscal and policy efforts. Governments bear the onus of
demonstrating that they are doing the best they can within the maximum
extent of available resources.33 There is a range of tools and techniques to
help evaluate compliance, without pretense at precision, and a rich body of
comparative jurisprudence at national, regional and international levels
from which to draw.34 In broad terms, assessments of policy efforts can be
made in three ways: measuring behind (by reference to the past rate of
progress), across (by reference to the progress being achieved by similarly
situated countries) and within (an objective assessment of national
capacities, drawing upon economic modeling, costing assessments, and
fiscal space analysis).35 If the "feasibility" of the MDGs at a global level is
determined by mere extension of the rate of progress between 1960 and
1990, one may well ask: "why bother with the MDGs at all?" After all,
human development progress prior to 1990, such as it was, occurred
without the benefit of the MDGs "global compact." Committing to a
continuation of past global trends seems singularly unambitious from this
point of view, and in any case, such global extrapolations offer an entirely
inadequate basis for measuring national progress.36
32. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
33. Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3: The Nature
of States Parties' Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant), 5 Sess. T 9., U.N. Doc.
E/1991/23 (Dec. 14, 1990).
34. Human rights accountability methodological tools are surveyed in Eitan Felner, Closing
the 'Escape Hatch': A Toolkit to Monitor the Progressive Realisation of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 1 OxF. J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 402 (2009); and Ignacio Saiz, Rights in Recession? Challenges for
Economic and Social Rights Enforcement in Times of Crisis, 1(2) OxF. J. HuM. RTS. PRAC. 277-93
(2009). For insightful analyses of comparative social rights jurisprudence, see LITIGATING
HEALTH RIGHTS: CAN COURTS BRING MORE JUSTICE TO HEALTH? (Alicia Ely Yamin & Siri
Gloppen eds., 2011); SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAW (Malcolm Langford ed., 2008); and COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE: JUDICIAL
ENFORCMENT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (Varun Gauri &
Daniel Brinks eds., 2008).
35. Anderson & McKay, supra note 25 (arguing that all three methods have distinctive
advantages as well as limitations, and should be used together as far as possible). To rely
exclusively upon "measuring behind" the MDGs method fails to capture critical changes in
national circumstances such as increasing value of a country's main export or, conversely, a
financial or environmental crisis.
36. See Hamid Tabatabai, MDG Targets: Misunderstood or Misconceived? INTERNATIONAL
POVERTY CENTRE, ONE PAGER, NO. 33, Apr. 2007. For some targets, such as reducing child
mortality, successful trajectories are more likely to follow an S-shaped than linear curve,
reflecting the relative effort and inputs required at different stages of progress. See William
Easterly, How the Millennium Development Goals are Unfair to Africa, 37 WORLD DEV. 26 (2009). In
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From a human rights perspective it can also be argued that ambitious
targets are especially warranted for problems, such as maternal mortality
and morbidity, that are determined more by deeply entrenched
discrimination and inadequate political will than by resource constraints.37
Even should we fall short of Target 5.A in global terms, as is presently the
case, failure may paradoxically have value in exposing the underlying
causes of the problem, thereby mobilising public outrage and political
pressure for action. Conversely, unduly modest targets may constitute
complicity in failure.
4. The MDGs have been misinterpreted, or misused, in practice
Some of the other more serious concerns relate not to the formulation of
particular MDGs, but to the manner in which they have been interpreted or
applied at the national level. The MDGs, interpreted sensibly, were not
intended to constitute a complete development agenda, and do not say
anything about the policies needed to achieve the goals. To transpose the
global MDGs targets and indicators - directly and literally - within national
planning frameworks, has resulted in the MDGs sometimes furnishing the
basis for praise where it is not warranted, as well as unfair criticism where
governments have in fact been making serious efforts.38 The signals from
the U.N. have not been entirely consistent in this respect.39 The relevance of
the "global" MDGs as human rights benchmarks, and proxies for specific
obligations under human rights treaties, is deeply dubious without
tailoring to national conditions and resource constraints, and without
disaggregating data and monitoring progress at the sub-national level
across different population groups.
5. The MDGs are equity-blind and may have exacerbated global and
country-level inequalities
a more radical departure from traditional measurement techniques, other commentators have
argued that the focus should be on the rate of progress, rather than meeting MDG-based
targets themselves. See Sakiko Fukuda-Parr & Joshua Greenstein, How Should MDG
Implementation be Measured? Faster Progress or Meeting Targets?, (International Policy Centre for
Inclusive Growth, Working Paper No. 63, 2010).
37. U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/39, supra note 29, at 7.
38. See, e.g., discussion supra note 21; Easterly, supra note 23.
39. For example, the co-chair of the U.N. inter-agency expert group responsible for the
MDGs, Jan Vandemoortele, has consistently argued for tailoring the global MDGs to national
conditions. See, e.g., Vandemoortele, supra note 19. But U.N. reports have frequently stated, or
at least implied, that the global MDGs are intended to be taken literally as national targets. See,
e.g., United Nations, MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT 14 (2011) (hereinafter U.N.
MDGs Report 2011) ("Trends observed in South-Eastern Asia, Eastern Asia and Latin America
and the Caribbean suggest that they are likely to meet the hunger-reduction target by 2015....
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The "equity-blindness" of the MDGs is probably the feature that has
generated the strongest criticism. In this article the term "equity" refers
generally to notions of fairness and distributive justice. 40 The global MDGs
provide global assessments of human development progress based upon
"average" outcomes. As a result, the MDGs may inadvertently occlude
analysis of differential outcomes for populations in the upper versus lower
income quintiles, or overlook the particular barriers faced by women,
children, indigenous peoples, minorities, persons with disabilities, and
other groups who may face discrimination. Taken literally, the MDGs may
easily be achieved in many countries without any effort to reach the most
marginalised populations. In the worst cases, this can divert attention
disproportionately to the "lowest hanging fruits" and populations that are
easiest to reach, thereby exacerbating existing inequalities.
Since the year 2000, inequalities between and within countries have
been increasing. 41 Recent research by UNICEF showed that in eighteen out
of twenty-six developing countries with a decline in under-five mortality
(U5M) of ten percent or more, inequality in U5M between the poorest
twenty per cent and richest twenty per cent either increased or stayed the
same, and in ten of these countries inequality increased by ten percent or
more.42 UNICEF's research showed that immediate efforts to reach the
most excluded groups are efficient in the longer run,43 contrary to popular
assumptions, apart from compelling normative and moral considerations.
Certain MDG indicators, notably the U5M and net enrolment ratio
indicators, do compare progress between the bottom and top income
quintiles. The indicators for Target 7.C, monitoring access to improved
water sources and sanitation facilities, call explicitly for disaggregation
between urban and rural areas, and the official guidance on MDG
40. See United Nations Development Programme, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011:
SUSTAINABILITY AND EQUITY: A BETIER FUTURE FOR ALL (2011) (discussing the philosophical
origins of the term equity in liberal theory and the capabilities approach to human
development, and distinguishing inequities from inequalities in social outcomes). Not all
inequalities are "inequitable," or unfair, in this sense. However human rights law obliges
States to guarantee not only formal equality of opportunities under the law, but also to put in
place positive measures to level the playing field and ensure substantive (even if not perfect)
equality of outcomes, taking into account the justice of original conditions. Comm. on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 20, Non-discrimination in
economic, social and cultural rights (art. 2, paragraph 2, International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights), 42nd session, May 4-22 2009, at 8-9, 37-39, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/GC/20 (July 2, 2009).
41. Robert Wade, Globalisation, Growth, Poverty, Inequality, Resentment and Imperialism, in
GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 617 (John Ravenhill, 3d ed., 2011); UNITED NATIONS RESEARCH
INST. FOR Soc. DEVELOPMENT, COMBATING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY: STRUCTURAL CHANGE,
SOCIAL POLICY AND POLITICS 62-76 (2010); HDR 2010, supra note 21, at 72-77; Isabel Ortiz &
Matthew Cummins, Global Inequality: Beyond the Bottom Billion: A Rapid Review of Income
Distribution in 141 Countries, (UNICEF Soc. and Econ. Policy, Working Paper, Apr. 2011). While
estimation methods and assumptions vary, it seems that disparities in income, health and
other indicators of well-being are larger across nations than within nations: DANI RODRIK, THE
GLOBALIZATION PARADOx: DEMOCRACY AND THE FUTURE OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 136 (2011).
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indicators asks that data for all MDGs be disaggregated "as far as possible"
by sex and disparities between urban and rural areas.44 But disaggregation
is inadequate in practice.45 The official guidance on MDG indicators
provides little if any instruction on disaggregation along many other
potentially relevant axes of discrimination prohibited under human rights
treaties. On disparities between ethnic groups, the U.N. handbook only
remarks that "analysing data on specific ethnic groups may be a sensitive
issue in the country," without any guidance as to why monitoring
disparities along ethnic or other lines might nevertheless be essential, and
how sensitivities might be addressed, or what proxies might be feasible
where necessary. 46
Gender equality is a particular concern. At the Millennium Summit,
Member States committed themselves to promote "gender equality and the
empowerment of women as effective ways to combat poverty, hunger and
disease and to stimulate development that is truly sustainable." 7 Seventy
per cent of people living in poverty are women, and nearly two-thirds of
the 780 million people who cannot read are women. However, MDG 3
("promote gender equality and empower women"), Target 3.A, focuses
only on eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education,
"preferably by 2005," and in all areas of education by 2015. Two of the three
indicators include the share of women in paid employment in the non-
agriculture sector, and percentage of women in parliament. But this
excludes many other areas - including the private sphere - where women
and girls experience discrimination. Data shortages are certainly a critical
constraint in many countries. But this is often more a matter of political will
than resource constraints. Discrimination issues, including violence against
women and other root causes of marginalisation, should be better reflected
in the structure of the MDGs, within applicable statistical parameters, as
well as in national reporting.48
6. Certain MDGs may undermine international human rights law
44. United Nations, Indicators for Monitoring the Millennium Development Goals, 17, 64-68,
U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SR.F/95 (2003).
45. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
MDGS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRACTICE: A REVIEW OF COUNTRY REPORTING 9-14 (2010). On the
causal significance of ethnic and geographic exclusion for the MDGs see Lancet & London
International Development Centre Commission, supra note 15, at 15. See also Report of the
Independent Expert on Minority Issues, Achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) for
Minorities: A Review of MDG Country Reports and Poverty Reduction Strategies, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/4/9/Add. 1 (Mar. 2,2007).
46. United Nations, supra note 44, at 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 33.
47. Millennium Declaration, supra note 4, 1 20.
48. "Tackling violence against women would address the gender dimensions of the
Development Goals," Statement of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Rashida Manjoo, Geneva, Dec. 6, 2010, available at
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewslD=10582&LangID
=E. For further recommendations, including additional targets on land ownership and political
representation, see Malcolm Langford, A Poverty of Rights: Six Ways to Fix the MDGs, 41(1) IDS
BULLETIN 83, 85 (2010).
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standards
In certain cases, the specific formulation of particular MDGs may
conflict with or undermine international human rights treaty standards. For
example, MDG 2 (universal primary education) omits the requirement that
primary education be free-of-charge, in an about-face from previous
summit commitments and in defiance of overwhelming empirical evidence
on how formal and informal fees reduce school attendance and completion
rates. 49 There is an obvious difference between the elimination of school
fees as a legal obligation, rather than a matter of good policy. This is not a
case of an explicit and direct conflict. However, it does at the very least
underscore the need to interpret the MDGs in line with corresponding
international human rights standards.
Target 7.C has also drawn criticism in this respect. This target commits
states to "halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable
access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation."5 0 All MDGs are
functionally related to varying degrees, and water and sanitation are critical
for achieving education, food, health, and child mortality goals. The right to
water under Article 11 of the ICESCR, as interpreted by the Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) and recently accepted by the
U.N. General Assembly and Human Rights Council, includes an explicit
concern for safety and quality, as well as affordability, or water for
domestic or personal use.51 The Millennium Declaration, in paragraph 19,
had referred to halving the number of people unable to access or afford
"safe" drinking water. However the affordability criterion did not survive
translation to the MDGs beyond the implicit acknowledgement of the
requirement for "sustainable" access, and the safety criterion was reflected
in the title of the target but not the indicators, which measure only access to
an "improved source" (such as a protected well or piped water). The critical
problem with this formulation is that "improved" sources are not
necessarily safe in practice; that is to say, water can be piped into an
improved facility from a contaminated source. UNICEF rapid surveys in six
countries found that fifteen to thirty-five percent of "improved" water
sources actually contained contaminated water.52 Moreover, pilot studies
49. UNICEF, supra note 42, at 34; U.N. MDGs Report 2011, supra note 39, at 17; UNESCO,
Education for All Global Monitoring Report: Reaching the Marginalised, 45, 165-66, 186-90 (2010).
Goal 2 of the internationally agreed goals flowing from the 1990 Jomtien Summit and World
Education Forum in Dakar, Senegal, April 26-28, 2000, is: "[Einsuring that by 2015 all children,
particularly girls, children in difficult circumstances and those belonging to ethnic minorities,
have access to, and complete, free and compulsory primary education of good quality.. . ." See
Dakar Framework for Action, U.N. Doc. ED-2000/WS/27, 7(ii) (Apr. 26-28, 2000).
50. See official list of MDG indicators, supra note 7.
51. Human Rights Council Res. 15/L.14, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 15t" Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/L.14 (Sept. 24, 2010); G.A. Res. 64/292, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/292 (July
28, 2010); CESCR, General Comment No. 15 (2002), The right to water (arts. 11 and 12 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11
(Jan. 20, 2003).
52. WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation, Report
of the First Consultation on Post-2015 Monitoring of Drinking Water and Sanitation 18-19 (May 3-5,
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by the United Nations Human Settlement Programme (U.N.-Habitat) show
that if other normative components of the right to water are monitored - in
particular, affordability and regularity of water supply - the true picture
regarding water accessibility worsens quite dramatically. 53 Taking the key
human rights criteria into account, the number of those who lack of access
to safe water may actually be closer to three billion people rather than the
official estimate of 900 million!4 The U.N.'s unduly glowing portrayal of
global progress towards "safe" water does no service to these problems and
complexities.55
Target 7.D is perhaps the most inappropriately framed and
unambitious of all MDG targets. Target 7.D, emanating from the "Cities
Without Slums" initiative of the Cities Alliance, as reflected in paragraph 19
of the Millennium Declaration,5 6 commits states to "achieve[] a significant
improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum-dwellers," a mere ten
percent of those living in slums worldwide. U.N.-Habitat has reported that
227 million people have moved out of slum conditions since 2000; but at the
same time, the total number of people living in slums has actually increased
during this period, to over one billion in 2005, with 828 million in
developing countries alone in 2010. Target 7.D fails to refer to secure
tenure, which is the foremost consideration for most people in informal
settlements, along with other important attributes of the right to housing.57
2011), available at http://www.wssinfo.org/fileadmin/user-upload/resources/Report-on-
WHO-UNICEF-Berlin-Consultation-May-2011.pdf [hereinafter JMP Post-2015 Consultation
Report].
53. Virginia Roaf, Ashfaq Khalfan & Malcolm Langford, Monitoring Implementation of the
Right to Water: A Framework for Developing Indicators, GLOBAL ISSUE PAPERS, No. 14 (2005). See
also the report of the (former) independent expert on the issue of human rights obligations
related to access to safe drinking water and sanitation. Report of the Independent Expert on
the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Related to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation, 65th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/65/254 (Aug. 6,2010).
54. JMP Post-2015 Consultation Report, supra note 52, at 24.
55. U.N. MDGs Report 2011, supra note 39, at 53-54: "Progress to improve access to clean
drinking water has been strong. Globally, coverage increased from 77 per cent in 1990 to 87 per
cent in 2008. If this trend continues, the MDG drinking water target of 89 per cent coverage
will be met-and likely surpassed-by 2015." The report contains some discussion of
rural/urban disparities and differential progress by wealth quintile (though nothing on
gender-based disparities), however the upbeat headline observations are based solely upon
measurements of improved infrastructure rather than whether the drinking water from
improved sources is actually safe - or alternatively life-threatening - in practice.
56. See Cities Alliance, Cities without Slums, available at
http://www.citiesalliance.org/ca/cws-action-plan.
57. U.N./OHCHR (2008), supra note 20, at 40-42. Under Article 11 (1) of the ICESCR, States
parties "recognize the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his
family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of
living conditions." The CESCR defines the right to adequate housing as "the right to live
somewhere in security, peace, and dignity," including requirements of adequacy, affordability,
habitability, accessibility, availability of essential services and infrastructure, and protection
against forced evictions. See CESCR, General Comment 4, The Right to Adequate Housing, 6th
Sess., U.N. Doc. E/1992/23, 7-8 (Dec. 19, 1991); CESCR, General Comment 7, The Right to
Adequate Housing: Forced Evictions, 16th Session, 1997, U.N. Doc. E/1998/22, Annex IV (May
20, 1997). The U.N.'s handbook on monitoring the MDGs does include discussion of the
"proportion of households with access to secure tenure" as an indicator relevant to the
15
Darrow: The Millennium Development Goals: Milestones or Millstones? Human Rights Priorities for the Post-2015 Development Agenda
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
A number of countries have misinterpreted this Target, or misappropriated
the "Cities Without Slums" slogan as the target, and certain countries have
even reported on slum clearances as a policy measure to achieve MDG 7.58
But perhaps the most obviously defective Goal on its face is MDG 8
("global cooperation"), given its lack of any quantifiable, time-bound
targets. 59 This bald omission prevents MDG 8 from offering any basis to
hold richer countries and donor organisations to account for poverty in
low-income countries to which the former may, in particular cases, bear
varying degrees of factual, moral, and legal responsibility.60 Moreover, the
international commitment towards "fair" trade in the Millennium
Declaration was "lost in translation" to the MDGs, with MDG 8 now
referring only to "free" trade. This is not to suggest that human rights
accountability should categorically swing the way of extra-territorial
obligations of donor countries. While some poorer countries are genuinely
unable to realise even minimum essential levels of socioeconomic rights
despite good faith efforts, in the great majority of cases governments can
and ought to be doing a great deal more for their own populations. MDG 8
can and should not be seen as a get-out-of-jail-free-card for any country
with respect to its international human rights obligations. But the fact that
quantitative, time-bound targets are confined to developing countries'
obligations alone results in a lopsided global partnership for poverty
reduction, and a seriously imbalanced framework for global
accountability. 61
7. MDGs have been co-opted by the growth and aid lobbies
More fundamentally still, beyond defective formulations in the global
monitoring framework, is that the actual economic and social policies
through which states have purportedly pursued the MDGs still appear
overwhelmingly to be circumscribed within a long discredited neo-liberal
predecessor to MDG 7, Target D, although this is not in the official list of MDG indicators, and
as at 2003 it was recognised that data for this indicator were not generally available. See United
Nations, supra note 44, at 68-69; the official list of MDGs indicators, available at
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Host.aspx?Content=Indicators/OfficialList.htm.
58. See, e.g., Viet Nam Achieving the Millennium Development Goals 50 (Aug. 2005), available at
http://www.undg.org/archive docs/6623-Viet Nam FourthMDGReport.pdf. See also
U.N./OHCHR, supra note 45, at 9; MARIE HUCHZERMEYER, CITIES WITH 'SLUMS': FROM
INFORMAL SETTLEMENT ERADICATION TO A RIGHT TO THE CITY IN AFRICA 34-45, 167-223 (2011).
Conscious of these gaps, the United Nations now encourages States to go beyond MDG Target
7.D in terms of the ambition of their targeting at national, regional and local levels as well as in
promoting "access to affordable land with secure tenure and to create the conditions in which
people are able to carve out and sustain a livelihood." See U.N. MDGs Report 2011, supra note
39, at 57.
59. Supra note 9.
60. Cf. THOMAS POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2nd ed., 2008) (positing an
institutional cosmopolitan theory of global social justice premised upon our shared
participation in global economic institutions, and the inequitable distribution of resources and
opportunities mediated through those institutions).
61. See Aldo Caliari & Mac Darrow, International Cooperation, MDG 8 and Human Rights, in
Langford et al., eds., supra note 20, for a human rights critique of MDG 8.
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economic growth model. 62 Defying all evidence to the contrary, 63 the global
development policy debate remains dominated by the implicit formula:
"faster economic growth + more foreign aid + better governance = MDGs." The
fact that inequality has increased in the majority of countries, for the
majority of the MDGs, is, in Vandemoortele's view, "dismissed as
irrelevant or a passing phase."M
In this regard it is sobering to note that global progress towards the
MDGs, and the income poverty target in MDG 1, in particular, has been
driven largely by aggregate gains through economic growth policies in
China and India, based upon policies that pre-dated the MDGs. The drive
towards higher growth rates is all the more evident in the continuing
fallout from the global economic crisis. If growth continues as the dominant
policy objective as an end unto itself, without sufficient concern for its
complex and contingent theoretical and empirical relationships with
inequality, and with insufficient appreciation of the reverse causal
relationship between social investments and growth, the recipe for the
future might well be increasing global and national inequalities, insecurity
and human rights violations.65
C. Conclusions on the MDGs' Impacts
The MDGs emerged from obscurity but have influenced development
discourse and policy to a degree far beyond the expectations of their
architects, supporting a vision of development in line with Amartya Sen's
human capability theories rather than per-capita GDP growth. The MDGs'
impacts on national poverty reduction policies and human development
outcomes have been variable and more difficult to assess. Nevertheless,
improvements in statistical methods and global monitoring of human
development goals may to some degree be attributed to the MDGs. But
human rights shortcomings are evident as well. Human rights advocates
have responded to the MDGs in different ways: some continue to condemn
62. See, e.g., Degol Hailu, Is the Washington Consensus Dead? INTERNATIONAL POLICY
CENTRE FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH, One Pager No. 82 (2009), available at http://www.ipc-
undp.org/pub/IPCOnePager82.pdf; Rick Rowden, We've Yet to Kill Off the Washington
Consensus, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 24, 2010, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-
development/poverty-matters/2010/nov/24/washington-consensus The 2011 global
monitoring report produced by the staffs of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund
(IMF) includes a preponderant focus on economic growth as the main ingredient for achieving
the MDGs, a conclusion supported by "preliminary econometric results." World Bank and
IMF, GLOBAL MONITORING REPORT 2011: IMPROVING THE ODDS OF ACHIEVING THE MDGs:
HETEROGENEITY, GAPS AND CHALLENGES 5 (2011).
63. See, e.g., HDR 2010, supra note 21 (rejecting economic policy templates and illustrating
the many economic development trajectories that have achieved reasonable human
development outcomes in practice).
64. Jan Vandemoortele, The MDG Conundrum: Meeting the Targets Without Missing the Point,
27 DEV. POL'Y REV. 355,363-64 (2009).
65. See generally HORIZONTAL INEQUALITIES AND CONFLICT: UNDERSTANDING GROUP
VIOLENCE IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES (Frances Stewart ed., 2008); WORLD BANK, WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011: CONFLICT, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT 30, 75-76 (2011) (showing
a causal relationship between group-based inequalities and violent conflict).
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the MDGs, some ignore them entirely, and others pragmatically engage
with the MDGs as potential vehicles for human rights realisation. Most of
the human rights treaty bodies and Special Procedures of the U.N. Human
Rights Council concerned about the MDGs fall into the third category.
However, many of the critiques appear to reflect differing
understandings about what the MDGs were intended to be. As originally
conceived, the MDGs were intended as collective (not country-specific)
targets. They were designed for a wide audience beyond policymakers and
development practitioners, in order to simplify human development
messages and to help generate the political will necessary to translate
commitments into action. In the words of one of their architects and main
proponents, the MDGs were designed to be "useful servants but poor
masters," and those who would criticise particular countries (or entire
regions, such as Sub-Saharan Africa) for missing the goals are "missing the
point."66 Global goals and targets must self-evidently be adapted to
national conditions and particularities. As the experience of the World
Summit for Children made clear, global goals "first need to be adapted to
the specific realities of each country. . . . Such adaptation of the goals is of
crucial importance to ensure their technical validity, logistical feasibility,
financial affordability and to secure political commitment and broad public
support for their achievement." 67 Adaptation must include measuring
disparities, which - with a just a few exceptions - are absent from the
MDGs' focus on global averages.
But for a great many governments and constituencies, the need to tailor
or contextualise the MDGs to national conditions is not self-evident. Even
when tailoring has been undertaken, for example in setting more ambitious
targets or sub-national targets to capture disparities between regions, or
adding "governance" targets, human rights questions and contradictions
remain.68 What role should human rights play, therefore, in the articulation
or adaptation of MDGs targets at the national level, and in their
implementation? This has been the subject of an extensive literature since
the year 2005, and was also on the agenda for the negotiations leading to
the September 2010 MDGs Summit in New York, the subject of the next
Section of this Article.
66. Vandemoortele, supra note 64, at 359, 363.
67. Id. at 358 (quoting UNICEF, UNICEF PLAN OF ACTION FOR IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD
DECLARATION ON THE SURVIVAL, PROTECTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF CHILDREN IN THE 1990s,
6 (1990), available at http://www.unicef.org/wsc/plan.htm).
68. Viet Nam and Cambodia are examples of national tailoring in terms of the content and
level of ambition of the MDGs. Thailand and Kenya are among the countries that have
adopted sub-national targets, and Mongolia adopted an additional MDG 9 on "human rights,
good governance and anti-corruption." See U.N./OHCR, supra note 45, at 9-14. None of these
countries have been immune from human rights criticism in the international media and
human rights monitoring bodies, including on grounds of structural inequalities and
discrimination against particular groups of people. Mongolia's MDG 9 includes a target to
"[dievelop a zero-tolerance environment to corruption in all spheres of society" which, while
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III. MDGs SUMMIT OUTCOME DOCUMENT
The MDGs Summit Outcome Document ("Summit Outcome")69
represents a significant advance in terms of U.N. policy and inter-
governmental agreements on human rights and development issues.
Human rights have been a highly politicised issue in inter-governmental
debates on development, particularly in recent years in the United Nations
General Assembly's (G.A.) Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review process
(TCPR, now the Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review or QCPR).70
Previous World Summit and global conference outcomes have been rich in
human rights content, including for example the Millennium Declaration
and 2005 World Summit Outcome,71 which is not the case for those
focusing on development or aid issues specifically, such as the TCPR and
Monterrey Consensus 2002 on financing for development. 72 This Section of
the Article offers a short review of the salient features of the Summit
Outcome from a human rights perspective, along with its weaknesses, as
the basis for conclusions about its significance as a platform and framework
for international negotiations towards the post-2015 development agenda.
A. The Summit Outcome Contains Many Explicit Human Rights
References and Commitments
The Summit Outcome contains an impressive number of explicit
human rights references and conmitments, as well as quite an impressive
degree of congruence with substantive human rights policy
recommendations as reflected in the jurisprudence of international human
rights bodies. There are certainly a range of areas where the document
could have been strengthened, especially in terms of the lack of
succinctness in the overall vision of development portrayed in the
document, and the generality of many of the Action Agenda commitments.
The total number of commitments (over one hundred) hardly constitutes a
succinct statement of development priorities, and there are real questions as
69. See Millennium Development Goals Summit Outcome Document, G.A. Res. 65/1, UN.
Doc. A/RES/65/1 (Sept. 17, 2010). A compendium of commitments of member states,
international organisations and private foundations and corporations is contained in the MDG
Summit Matrix (Nov. 12,2010), http://www.un.org/en/mdg/summit2010/pdf/
MDGSummit Matrix_12Nov2OlOrev2.pdf.
70. See Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/208 (Mar. 14, 2008).
The main purpose of the TCPR, and its successor the QCPR, is to evaluate the effectiveness
and efficiency of the U.N. development system's support to national development efforts, in
the context of global summit commitments.
71. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1, (Oct. 24, 2005).
72. Final text of agreements and commitments adopted at the International Conference on
Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mex., June 18-22, 2002, Monterrey Consensus on
Financing for International Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.198/11 (2003), available at
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/monterrey/MonterreyConsensus.pdf. Paragraph 11 of the
Monterrey Consensus recognised the importance of human rights in the context of good
governance and "market-oriented policies," and paragraph 12 recognised the importance of
empowering women and protecting labour rights. Otherwise human rights are at best implicit.
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to how much of the aid pledged at the MDGs Summit was actually "new,"
and how much will actually be delivered. However, in the context of an
intergovernmental negotiation of this kind, and the difficult compromises
that this entails for both the Global North and South, the explicit human
rights conmmitments are significant in principle and, potentially, in practice.
The introductory part of the Summit Outcome (paragraphs 1-35) is
replete with human rights references. While it is customary for human
rights to permeate preambular parts of global conference outcome
documents, it is unusual for this to occur with the frequency and specificity
exhibited in the Summit Outcome. Beyond recognising the purposes and
principles of the U.N. Charter and linkages between human rights,
development, and peace and security, (the so-called "3 pillars" of the U.N.
system),7 3 states indicate that they will be guided by the U.N. Charter "with
full respect for international law and its principles." 74 Moreover, states
explicitly recognise the importance of human rights for achieving the
MDGs, specifically, as well as for development generally.75 General human
rights and development linkages are commonly recognised in summit
outcome documents, but not human rights and MDGs links in particular.
Moreover, in a stocktaking of successful policies for achieving the MDGs,
states note the importance of "respecting, promoting and protecting all
human rights, including the right to development; increasing efforts to
reduce inequality and eliminate social exclusion and discrimination; [and]
enhancing opportunities for women and girls and advancing the economic,
legal and political empowerment of women." 76 These are notable advances,
although the document does not reiterate the 2005 World Summit Outcome
commitments to mainstream human rights in national development
policies and the work of the U.N.n in the same clear terms.
The Action Agenda (paragraphs 36-81 of the Summit Outcome) is also
strong in terms of textual references to human rights. Paragraph 70(u) of
the Summit Outcome reaffirms "the right of everyone to have access to safe,
sufficient and nutritious food, consistent with the right to adequate food
and the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger."78
Paragraph 71(a) commits states to "[rlealizing the right of everyone to
education and reemphasizing that education shall be directed at the full
development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity and
73. See Mac Darrow & Louise Arbour, The Pillar of Glass: Human Rights in the Development
Operations of the United Nations 103 AM. J. INT'L LAW 446 (2009) (critically appraising human
rights mainstreaming in development and the "three pillars" premise of the U.N. Charter).
74. Summit Outcome, supra note 69, 2.
75. Id. 11 3,12,13,53,54.
76. Id. 1 23 (j), (k), (1). Taken as a whole, paragraph 23 reads like a check-list for a human
rights approach to achieving the MDGs, calling for (among other things) setting targets for
universal access to social services, ensuring adequate participation, non-discrimination and
accountability, among other measures.
77. 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, supra note 71, 126.
78. See CESCR, General Comment 12, The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11), U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1999/5, It 7-13 (May 12, 1999) (which elaborates on the normative content of the right
to food under the ICESCR, and includes criteria relating to the adequacy and sustainability of
food availability and access).
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shall strengthen respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms." In
relation to Goal 5, states commit themselves to "[taking steps to realize the
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health, including sexual and reproductive health."7 9
On health more generally, states commit themselves to a number of
measures relating to health education and literacy to ensure respect for
human rights, and promote and protect human rights in combating HIV.8 0
There are a number of explicit human rights commitments relating to
gender equality and women's empowerment in the Summit Outcome,
including commitments in sub-paragraph 72(a) to take actions to achieve
the goals of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action81 and Cairo
Conference on Population and Development, 82 as well as to fulfill States
Parties' obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 83 and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).84 These commitments are
especially noteworthy in the context of a U.N. inter-governmental
agreement on development issues, specifically recalling and reinforcing
legally binding comm-itments of states under human rights treaties. States
also commit to strengthening their laws and programmes to prevent and
punish violence against women and girls, in conformity with international
human rights law, as well as to "equal access to adequate housing, property
and land, including rights to inheritance."8 5 The right of all women to
decent work is also recognised, within the framework of applicable
conventions of the International Labour Organisation. 86
Beyond the explicit references to human rights discussed above, there
are other respects in which the substantive policy recommendations in the
Summit Outcome are consistent with human rights standards as
interpreted by international human rights monitoring bodies. For example,
there is a consistent focus in the Action Agenda on accessibility,
affordability and quality of social services, as well as on universal access to
basic social services, consistent with international human rights
jurisprudence.8 7 The draft repeatedly calls for an analysis and assault on the
79. Summit Outcome, supra note 69, 75(a).
80. Id. 75(i), 76(b).
81. Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, Sept. 4-15, 1995, Report of the
Fourth World Conference on Women, 1-132 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1 (1996).
82. International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, Egypt, Sept. 5-13,
1994, Report of the International Conference on Population and Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.177/13 (1994). This conference was significant, among other reasons, for the
commitments of states to recognise and protect sexual and reproductive rights, which is
essential not only for their own sake, but also for the achievement of the maternal health
targets under MDG 5. See U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/39, supra note 29.
83. GA Res. 34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979).
84. GA Res. 44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989).
85. Summit Outcome, supra note 69, 7 2 (g), (k).
86. Id. 72(d).
87. Id. TT 51, 70(g). See, e.g., CESCR, supra note 78, 7-13; CESCR, General Comment 14,
The Highest Attainable Standard of Health, 22nd Session, Apr. 25-May 12, 2000, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/2000/4 12 (Aug. 11, 2000); CESCR, General Comment 19, The Right to Social
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"root causes" of lack of access to basic services,8 8 including barriers caused
by discrimination, which is a core normative attribute of internationally
recognised socio-economic rights. 89
B. The Summit Outcome Also Has a Number of Weaknesses
Perhaps unsurprisingly, there are also a number of human rights
omissions, ambiguities and tensions in the text. For example, as is the case
for MDG 2 itself, as was seen in subsection II.B.6, supra, eliminating user
fees is listed among policy options to achieve universal primary education,
but states did not reaffirm the human right to universal free primary
education under the ICESCR and CRC. On MDG 5, there is no explicit
requirement that states repeal laws that discriminate against women and
girls, notwithstanding the continuing evidence of their harmful impacts.90
The lone commitment of Member States on the "worst forms of child
labour" framed the issue principally as a matter of international
cooperation, to the neglect of more localised and immediate imperatives to
prohibit and punish such unconscionable practices. 91 The Summit Outcome
includes welcome commitments to provide sustainable access to safe
drinking water and basic sanitation in the context of health and
environment-related MDGs, 92 but fails - in these specific contexts - to
commit to affordable and culturally appropriate services, which are
normative attributes of the rights to water and sanitation as well as critical
Security, 39th Session, Nov. 5-23 2007, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/19 (Feb. 4, 2008). See also U.N.
Independent Expert on the Question of Human Rights and Extreme Poverty to the U.N.
Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/9 (Mar. 17, 2009) (by Magdalena Sepillveda
Carmona) (on the subject of cash transfer programmes), and to the U.N. G.A., U.N. Doc.
A/65/259 (Aug. 9, 2010) (on social protection measures to achieve the MDGs). The latter
report argues at paragraph 74: "Ensuring respect for [the principles of equality and non-
discrimination, in the context of the MDGs] implies a preference for schemes that are
universal. While targeting mechanisms may be seen as a way in which to reach those in
extreme poverty, States must remain focused on the ultimate goal [of universal access]. While
policies should prioritize the most vulnerable and disadvantaged, in accordance with human
rights standards, they must also form part of longer-term strategies to progressively ensure
universal coverage."
88. See, e.g., Summit Outcome, supra note 69, 71(d), 75(d).
89. See CESCR, General Comment 20, supra note 40.
90. Cf. U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/39, supra note 29.
91. Summit Outcome, supra note 69, 70(f) commits States to take "appropriate steps to
assist one another in the elimination of the worst forms of child labour, strengthening child
protection systems and combating trafficking in children through, inter alia, enhanced
international cooperation and assistance, including support for social and economic
development, poverty eradication programmes and universal education." See ILO, Convention
concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of
Child Labour, ILO Convention 182, 87th Sess., June 1999 (June 17, 1999), which rightly
recognises that poverty causes and contributes to child labour, and that education is part of the
solution (preamble, and Art. 8). However the "worst" forms of child labour covered by the
Convention include such practices as slavery and procurement of children for armed conflict,
prostitution, pornography and drug trafficking (Art. 3). In these circumstances, immediate
actions to prohibit, monitor and criminalise such practices should surely have been prioritised
(Arts. 1, 5 and 6).
92. Summit Outcome, supra note 69, 11 73(d), 73(f), 74(f), 77(h).
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determinants of access to water and sanitation services in practice.93 These
are hardly fundamental shortcomings in the larger scheme of the MDG
Summit negotiations, however they are worth underscoring in view of the
recent recognition of the human rights to water and sanitation by the U.N.
General Assembly and Human Rights Council, and the very poor record of
achievement by Member States on the sanitation target, in particular.
More problematical, however, are contradictions - or at least latent
tensions - between the Summit Outcome's environmental commitments
and the right to adequate housing under the ICESCR. On its face, there are
clearly a number of virtuous features in the material provision of the
Summit Outcome (paragraph 77(k)), in which states commit themselves to
accelerated progress towards MDG 7 (environmental sustainability)
through means including participatory national urban planning strategies
and promoting equal access to public services. 94 The problem, however, is
that the main goals expressed in this commitment are not necessarily
internally consistent: that is, to "[work] towards cities without slums,
beyond current targets, through reducing slum populations and improving
the lives of slum-dwellers." If we take into account the misinterpretation or
misappropriation of Target 7.D that has occurred in the past,9 5 the given
formulation risks encouraging a disproportionate focus on "reducing
slums" rather than slum upgrading, with no reflection of the right to
security of tenure, which is a right critical to most if not all people living in
slums. 96 This language might lead to slum clearance policies unless the
need for slum upgrading and the security of land tenure are stated more
explicitly. In implementing this commitment and in connection with
negotiations towards the post-2015 development agenda, it is vital to
emphasize the commitment in the 2005 World Summit Outcome to
prioritize slum prevention and slum upgrading policies,97 as opposed to
slum clearance policies, and interpret such commitments in line with the
minimum procedural and substantive guarantees associated with the right
to adequate housing under the ICESCR.
93. See U.N. Doc. A/65/254, supra note 53.
94. Summit Outcome, supra note 69, 1 77(k) commits States to "[work] towards cities
without slums, beyond current targets, by reducing slum populations and improving the lives
of slum-dwellers, with adequate support of the international community, by prioritizing
national urban planning strategies with the participation of all stakeholders, promoting equal
access for people living in slums to public services, including health, education, energy, water
and sanitation and adequate shelter, and by promoting sustainable urban and rural
development."
95. Vietnam Achieving the Millennium Dev. Goals, supra note 58 and accompanying text.
96. On the sources and content of the right to adequate housing, see CESCR, Gen.
Comment 4, supra note 57.
97. World Summit Outcome, supra note 71, 1 56(m), commits States "[tlo achieve
significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum-dwellers by 2020, recognizing
the urgent need for the provision of increased resources for affordable housing and housing-
related infrastructure, prioritizing slum prevention and slum upgrading, and to encourage
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C. Principles of Equality and Non-discrimination Feature Prominently,
Far More than Principles of Participation and Accountability
Beyond evoking specific human rights standards, the Summit Outcome
also recalls and reinforces certain operational principles characteristic of a
human rights-based approach to development, notably, equality and non-
discrimination, participation, and accountability.98 The principles of
equality and non-discrimination feature prominently and systematically
throughout both the introductory part as well as the Action Agenda.
Commitment to equality and non-discrimination is particularly strong in
the context of gender equality and gender mainstreaming" and in relation
to the goal of "sustained, inclusive and equitable economic growth," 00 as
well as in commitments to guarantee universal access to social services and
social protection'Oland promote "more equitable access to economic
opportunities and special services." 0 2 The principles of equality and non-
discrimination are also implicit in commitments to ensure universal access
to food, education, decent work, HIV treatment and health (including
reproductive health) services.103 Member States also committed themselves
explicitly to eliminate social exclusion and discrimination," "combat[]
inequality at all levels,"1o5 focus on the poor and "vulnerable" including
persons with disabilities,106 take steps to ensure the rights of indigenous
peoples on the basis of equality and non-discrimination, 07 address the root
causes of inequalities, disparities, exclusion, and discrimination affecting
children in education, 08 end discrimination against women and girls in
education,109 address the root causes of maternal mortality and morbidity
including violence against women,"20 and address the stigmatization and
discrimination of people living with HIV.111 Importantly, there is also
repeated recognition of the need for disaggregated data and strengthening
98. For a discussion of these and other principles see United Nations Common
Understanding on a Human Rights Based Approach to Development Cooperation (2003),
available at http://www.undg.org/archive-docs/6959-TheHumanRightsBased
Approach-toDevelopmentCooperation Towards_a_CommonUnderstanding-amongUN.
pdf; U.N./OHCHR, Frequently Asked Questions on a Human Rights Based Approach to
Development Cooperation, HR/PUB/06/8 (2006), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FAQen.pdf; Mac Darrow & Amparo
Tomas, Power, Capture, Conflict: A Call For Human Rights Accountability in Development
Cooperation, 27 HUM. RTS. Q. 2,471 (2005).
99. Summit Outcome, supra note 69, 3, 12, 72.
100. Id. T$ 23(b), 41, 70(b).
101. Id. 11 51, 70(g).
102. Id. 1 28.
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of national statistical systems, to improve and monitor public policies and
address discrimination. 112 These commitments, if implemented, would fill
significant gaps in the MDGs framework.
The principle of participation is reflected reasonably strongly in
relation to the empowerment and participation of women in political and
economic decision-making processes, as well as in the commitment of states
to encourage participation in national urban planning strategies under
MDG 7.113 But beyond this, the references to participation in the Summit
Outcome appear to be quite tokenistic and technocratic. Participation is
highlighted as an instrumental need in connection with the improvement of
national health governance and sanitation, 14 and more generally in
connection with promoting the "involvement" of people living with
HIV/AIDS in national HIV strategies. 115 At the global level, there is
recognition of the importance of increasing the voice and representation of
poorer countries on the governing bodies of the international financial
institutions.116 Member States also call for civil society organisations (CSOs)
and non-government organisations (NGOs) to "enhance their role in
national development efforts,"117 however governments' duties to enable
such participation are not mentioned.
There is no explicit recognition in the Summit Outcome of participation
as a right, and no specific commitments to guarantee freedom of expression
and association or other indispensible human rights guarantees for active,
free and meaningful participation. With the two exceptions mentioned
above,s18 participation is treated more as a duty or privilege than a right, or
alternatively (as in the case of sanitation) as contributions by user groups to
service delivery. The Summit Outcome encourages "broad consultations
and participation of all relevant stakeholders" in national development
strategies, but this comes with the caveat "as appropriate for each national
context."119 The unfortunate implication, therefore, is that broad
consultations and participation may not be appropriate in certain national
contexts, at the discretion of the government of the day. This falls well short
of the interpretation of "national ownership" reflected in the OECD's policy
guidance on this subject,120 and is a far cry from the idea of participation as
112. Id. 23(s), 68, 72(h), 73(j).
113. Id. 72(f), 77(k) respectively. The former commitment compensates to a modest
degree for the relatively weak MDG 3 commitments in relation to women's empowerment, as
discussed supra subsection 11.B.5.




118. Supra note 113 and accompanying text.
119. Summit Outcome, supra note 69, 36.
120. See OECD DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE (OECD-DAC), ACTION-ORIENTED
POLICY PAPER ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT (2007), Principle 6 ("Consider human
rights in decisions on alignment and aid instruments."),
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/7/39350774.pdf. See also the report of the 3RD HIGH
LEVEL FORUM ON AID EFFECTIVENESS, ACCRA AGENDA FOR ACTION, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/16/41202012.pdf. In 13(c) of the Accra Agenda for
2012] 79
25
Darrow: The Millennium Development Goals: Milestones or Millstones? Human Rights Priorities for the Post-2015 Development Agenda
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
a human right. 121
These flaws are regrettable, but hardly surprising in the context of an
inter-governmental negotiation of this kind. The idea of participation is
honoured more in the theory than practice of development, and is rarely
embraced and implemented as a human right. In the context of the MDGs
and the delivery of basic social services, participation is especially prone to
instrumentalisation or colonisation, often reduced to the involvement of
communities and user groups in service delivery (or cheap labour, in crude
terms), rather than control over policy choices. 122 This is not to trivialise the
challenges involved in making participation effective in any given context.
"Active, free and meaningful" participation 23 is by definition threatening
to those in positions of power, whatever the demonstrated benefits for
human development. From donor organisations' perspectives, creating
space and capacities for effective participation is often seen to run against
the grain of financial disbursement and results-based management
imperatives. These are among the reasons why human rights have
historically gained such little traction in inter-governmental development
debates, and conversely, why the consensus on so many other aspects of
the human rights agenda in the Summit Outcome is so notable.
As with participation, the Summit Outcome reveals a number of
shortcomings insofar as the principle of "accountability" is concerned,
which mirror deficits in MDG accountability mechanisms in practice. 124
Action, donor and partner countries undertook to "ensure that their respective development
policies and programmes are designed and implemented in ways consistent with their agreed
international commitments on gender equality, human rights, disability and environmental
sustainability."
121. Cf. Darrow & Tomas, supra note 98, at 506-10; U.N./OHCHR, Principles and Guidelines
for a Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction Strategies, U.N. Doc. HR/PUB/06/12(2006),
available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/PovertyStrategiesen.pdf;
Guideline 5, Participation, at 14-16; U.N./OHCHR, Claiming the MDGs, supra note 20, at 11-
12; U.N./OHCHR & WHO, Human Rights, Health and Poverty Reduction Strategies, U.N. Doc
HR/PUB/08/05 (2008), at 14-20, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Publications/HHR PovertyReductionsStrategiesWHOEN.pdf.
122. Cf. U.N./OHCHR, supra note 45, at 28.
123. The term in quotations derives from the U.N. Declaration on the Right to
Development, G.A. Res. 41/128 (Dec. 4, 1986).
124. The principle of accountability has relatively well-defined content in light of
international human rights standards. See, e.g., Darrow & Tomas, supra note 98, at 511-14;
U.N./OHCHR, Principles and Guidelines for a Human Rights Approach to Poverty Reduction
Strategies, supra note 121, at 17-19. The General Assembly carries out an annual development
dialogue on the follow-up to the Millennium Declaration and the 2005 World Summit
Outcome, and States are invited to make presentations of their progress towards meeting the
MDGs to the Economic and Social Council's Annual Ministerial Review. See G.A. Res 60/265,
91 56, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/265 (July 12, 2006). The biennial "Development Cooperation
Forum" of the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) also reviews global trends and
progress on development cooperation relating to the MDGs: World Summit Outcome, supra
note 71, 1 155(b). Global, regional and national MDG reports are also produced by, or with the
support of, the United Nations, and as of November 2011 the United Nations was establishing
an "Integrated Implementation Framework" as a global platform to monitor the delivery on
commitments from the September 2010 MDGs Summit, see
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sgsml3244.doc.htm. However, the established
MDG accountability mechanisms are notoriously weak. There is no independent monitoring
80 [Vol. 15
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"Accountability" is the leitmotif of human rights approaches to
development; however it can mean many different things to different
people. For present purposes, drawing from principles of public
administration, human rights and global administrative law, 125
"accountability" refers to policymakers and other duty-bearers being held
to transparent and objective performance standards, informed by
international human rights law, against which they are answerable to those
affected by their decisions and actions. The three closely related purposes of
accountability, under this definition, are to strengthen incentives for
delivering on global and national legal and policy commitments, improve
policymaking and service delivery, and ensure that those whose rights are
infringed have timely and effective redress. 126
The Summit Outcome refers to accountability -and more generic
"good governance" or rule of law principles-in a number of contexts,
including in relation to healthcare, 127 sustainable development and the
eradication of poverty, and hunger, 128 as well as gender equality, women's
human rights and empowerment. 129 Anti-corruption commitments also
feature in the document, and there are references to the idea of "mutual
accountability" between developing and donor states, although these
references could have been strengthened by explicitly prioritising
accountability of both developing and donor governments directly to
individuals affected by the aid relationship.13 o However, the most obvious
accountability deficiencies relate to the lengthy and undifferentiated nature
of the commitments themselves. The commitments of states in the Action
Agenda are generally expressed to be non-inclusive, and a list of over one
or evaluation of national MDG reports, no forum for complaints, and only seven countries
chose to give presentations to the ECOSOC Annual Ministerial Review in 2009. Salil Shetty,
supra note 16.
125. Under emerging principles of global administrative law, accountability requires that
administrative bodies meet adequate standards of transparency, participation, reasoned
decision, legality, and provide effective review of their decisions. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico
Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 15 (2004-2005). For fuller analysis of accountability rationales, principles and
mechanisms in the context of the MDCs, see U.N./OHCHR & Centre for Economic and Social
Rights, The Millennium Development Goals: Wo's Accountable? (forthcoming 2012).
126. For a useful exposition of the concept of redress in the context of service delivery, see
Varun Gauri, Redressing Grievances and Complaints Regarding Basic Service Delivery, POLICY
RESEARCH WORKING PAPER No. 5699, World Bank (June 2011), at 2-7.
127. Summit Outcome, supra note 69, 1 63.
128. Id. I 11.
129. Id. 12, 72.
130. Id. 78(c) for example recognises "that the commitments made by developed and
developing countries in relation to the Millennium Development Goals require mutual
accountability." The term "mutual accountability" is a term of art in aid effectiveness jargon;
however, the challenge in practice is to ensure that accountability between donor States and
organizations and partner country governments does not displace the accountability of each
towards the supposed subjects and beneficiaries of development, that is to say, individuals
and communities in the partner country. See, e.g., MARTA FORESTI, DAVID BOOTH & TAMMIE
O'NEIL, AID EFFECTIVENESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: STRENGTHENING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
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hundred commitments is more difficult to monitor than a shorter,
prioritised list. The poor or vague formulation of certain recommendations
is another problem, 131 although these kinds of deficiencies are hardly novel
or surprising within the challenging constraints of a political negotiation of
this kind. The idea that there should be effective (or any) redress for failure
to achieve the social rights embodied in the MDGs is anathema.
As for donor country accountability more particularly, the
commitments in the "MDG 8 - Global Partnership" part of the Action
Agenda are numerous. Commitments in the latter part include: reaffirming
international aid commitments from previous global conferences;
implementing the Doha "development" round of trade negotiations and
Gleneagles commitments on aid to Africa; ensuring access to affordable
medicines through public health flexibilities under the WTO Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS); and
eliminating agricultural subsidies. 132 However, these commitments are not
necessarily new. While they may offer a guide to the interpretation of MDG
8 going forward, they do not cure structural accountability defects in MDG
8 and its lack of time-bound monitorable targets and do not offset the poor
implementation record in practice. 133
D. Conclusions Concerning the Human Rights Significance of the Summit
Outcome
The Summit Outcome reflects a number of significant strengths from a
human rights point of view, but also a number of clear weaknesses.
However, the limitations discussed in Section III.A, while noteworthy, are
not fatal to the conceptual integrity of the document as a whole, and should
not detract from the remarkable inter-governmental consensus on human
rights being indispensible for the realisation of the MDGs. Whatever the
particularities and trade-offs of the Summit Outcome negotiating process,
the resulting human rights commitments deserve to be taken seriously. The
main focus should now be on determining how best to capitalise upon the
document's strengths, while marshalling international human rights law in
order to fill gaps and help resolve ambiguities. In this regard, the document
asks that the General Assembly review the MDGs annually, "including in
the implementation of this outcome document."134 In effect, this may be
taken to mean that the MDGs should be interpreted, implemented and
monitored in light of the Summit Outcome's human rights commitments.
131. For example, it is hard to see how a government could be held to account for failure to
implement "forward-looking economic policies," see Summit Outcome, supra note 69, 70(b),
or to implement "political, economic, social, financial and technical solutions in the short,
medium and long term" in response to the global food crisis, id. 70(n).
132. Id. 78(a), (e), (t), (p).
133. See U.N. MDG Gap Task Force, Millennium Development Goal 8: The Global Partnership
for Development: Time to Deliver, Sales No. E.11.I.11 (2011) (giving an overview of international
progress towards MDG 8 and outlining serious shortcomings in virtually all MDG 8 Targets).
134. Summit Outcome, supra note 69, 1 79.
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The U.N. Secretary General is also asked to report annually on progress,
and the President of the General Assembly is asked to organise a Special
Event on the MDGs in 2013.135 These provisions provide important
milestones and entry points for the more effective positioning of human
rights in the lead-up to negotiations on the post-2015 development agenda.
IV. PROBLEMATISING AND TRANSCENDING THE "VALUE ADDED" PARADIGM
Ever since human rights entered the development lexicon in the 1990s,
their proponents have been pressed to demonstrate the "value added," in
instrumental and presumptively quantifiable terms, of human rights in
development. Rightly or wrongly, this remains the dominant framing of
human rights in development debates. While the text of the Summit
Outcome document reflects both consequentialist and deontological
justifications for human rights,136 the former justifications by definition
appeal to the more pragmatic dispositions of negotiators, economists and
policymakers. Hence the debates about the substantive justifications for
human rights, in an already complicated international development
landscape, can be expected to intensify towards 2015.
There is of course nothing in the human rights regime that precludes
consequentialist justifications outright,137 and no reason why those
asserting the relevance, or even primacy, of human rights should not be put
to proof. The development marketplace is crowded and heterogeneous,
hardened by history and ideological conflict, and inured to passing
theories, charlatans and fads. Those who have been toiling for decades in
development's name are surely entitled to understand what, precisely,
newer entrants into the marketplace are bringing, what the distinctive
contributions of any putative new paradigm are, and exactly where -
according to the new paradigm - prevailing theories and orthodox methods
of development work are falling short. The problem does not lie in the
legitimacy of the "value added" question; rather, what may be problematic
are the assumptions underpinning the question, and the failure of many
participants in the human rights and development debate -particularly
from within the field of neo-classical economics but also many human
rights practitioners -to exhibit the -degree of critical self-reflection,
135. Id. 79, 81.
136. Consequentialism refers to theories that hold that the outcomes of one's conduct are
the appropriate basis for moral judgments about that conduct, whereas deontology derives the
rightness or wrongness of conduct from the character of the behaviour itself. Empirical
justifications of human rights in development are more readily conformable to the former kind
of reasoning. The Summit Outcome recognises both kinds of justification, although more
explicitly in the former (consequentialist) case. Supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. For
justifications reflecting deontological reasoning, at least implicitly, see, for example, id. 2
(States indicate that they will be guided by the U.N. Charter "with full respect for international
law and its principles.").
137. See JOHN TOBIN, THE RIGHT TO HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012) at 57-58
(referring to the first two preambular paragraphs of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948)).
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humility, and spirit of open inquiry necessary for effective engagement on
complex interdisciplinary questions.
This Section begins by outlining three contestable assumptions or
problems relating to the "value added" challenge, specifically: (1) the
assumption that human rights necessarily require a wholesale paradigm
shift (the absolutist assumption), (2) ideological assumptions inconsistent
with human rights (free market fundamentalism), and (3) the assumption
or contention that the "value added" of human rights lies in their
contribution towards economic growth (the confusion of means with ends).
Once traversing these problematic premises, the discussion moves to a
deeper analysis of the principles, processes, and mechanisms through
which human rights may influence service delivery and policymaking
relevant to the MDGs. This part of the discussion draws upon a growing
empirical literature on the impacts of social rights litigation in different
countries and regions, as well as theoretical accounts of the relationship
between human rights and neo-classical welfare economics. The Section
concludes by offering a nuanced and synthetic articulation of decision-
making principles drawn from the theory and practice of human rights,
focusing on the role of human rights in revaluing policy debates,
challenging problematic assumptions of neoclassical economics, correcting
market failures, strengthening accountability for policy choices, and re-
politicising development, thereby opening space for social change. In doing
so, this Section exposes and transcends the reductionism and pure
consequentialism inherent in the "value added" challenge, and frames a
case for more focused interdisciplinary dialogue leading towards 2015.
A. The Absolutist Assumption
The first problem relating to the "value added" challenge is that it may
implicitly convey the assumption that the validity and relevance of human
rights to development depend upon all features of the human rights
framework being unique and hitherto unknown in development. This is
partly a substantive problem, and partly one of poor communication.
Responsibility for this problem lies at least in part at the feet of those who
would advocate for a categorical paradigm shift based uniquely on human
rights. Unduly categorical claims may foreclose legitimate critical inquiry
into potentially contentious premises of the international human rights
regime, such as the theoretical universality of human rights and questions
about the indivisibility and inter-dependence of rights in practice,138 and
may overlook well-established human development theories and practice
that run in very similar directions. One of the more significant contributions
of the 2003 U.N. Common Understanding on a Human Rights Based
Approach to Development Cooperation was to recognize a distinction and
138. These kinds of concerns are raised in Vandemoortele, supra note 26. See generally
David Kennedy, The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem? 15 HARV. HUM.
RTs. J. 101 (2002).
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a synergistic relationship between attributes of the human rights regime
that are distinctive and "essential" to development programming, as
against "good development practices" generally. 139 Whilst arguably too
categorical a distinction in the abstract, the underlying intention is sound:
to encourage a healthy degree of humility and thorough understanding of
the policy and operational context within which human rights arguments
should be located.
B. Ideological Blinkers and Free Market Fundamentalism
The second problem concerning the "value added" challenge stems
from the comparative power of the epistemic communities within the
development field, and the dominance of neo-classical economics in
particular.140 From the perspective of the latter, human rights - and social
rights in particular -may be disparaged as abstract or purely aspirational
norms or categorical ethical imperatives with an anti-market bias,
promoted by idealists blissfully disconnected from the hard trade-offs
necessary in a world of limited resources. Human rights may be
categorically dismissed as inherently subjective and value-laden, compared
with the putatively objective and value-neutral science of economics, 141 and
hence deserving of a particularly high standard of proof. For example, the
World Bank Chief Economist for Africa recently argued that human rights
were "neither necessary nor sufficient" for achieving education or health
outcomes. Human rights, the Chief Economist contended, are "not
necessary because countries that score very low on human rights indicators
(for civil and political rights), such as China and Cuba, score high on
various health and education indicators." 142 Human rights are "not
sufficient because countries that have constitutions with well delineated
and judicially enforced human rights, such as India and South Africa, have
relatively poor human development outcomes." 143 At the heart of that
commentator's concern is the fear that "making health and education
139. Supra note 98.
140. Neoclassical economics refers to approaches to economics focusing on the
determination of prices, outputs and income distributions in markets as a function of theories
of supply and demand, premised on rational choice theory under which self-interested, profit-
maximising individuals seek to maximise individual gains through voluntary exchange on the
basis of full, relevant information. E. Roy Weintrab, The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics (1st
ed., 1999-2008) available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Encl/
NeoclassicalEconomics.html.
141. Critics have questioned the value-neutral stance of neoclassical economics, pointing
to its political and ideological assumptions. See, e.g., GEORGE DEMARTINO, GLOBAL ECONOMY,
GLOBAL JUSTICE (2003); CONRAD P. WALIGORSKI, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF CONSERVATIVE
ECONOMISTS (1990).
142. Shanta Devaraja, Human Rights and Human Development. AFRICA CAN ... END POVERTY
(June 20, 2011) http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/human-rights-and-human-
development. (referring to a debate on human rights as a necessary condition for human
development (defined as education, health and social protection) that took place at the World
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human rights often implies that governments should finance and provide
health and education services," yet "there is plenty of evidence that
governments in many countries do badly at delivering these services to
poor people." 144
Certain fallacious assumptions in this reasoning are immediately
apparent. For instance, the author appears to equate human rights with
civil and political rights alone, and limits the scope and significance of
human rights to constitutional entrenchment and judicial enforcement.
Moreover, contrary to well-established doctrine and practice relating to
social rights, 145 the author appears to equate social rights categorically with
positive entitlements and direct service provision by the state. But the more
striking problem, and perhaps the most revealing irony, lies in the author's
apparently categorical rejection of public action in favour of the market.
This privileging of the market runs contrary to the nuance reflected in the
World Bank's prior research on pro-poor service provision,146 and does so
without a corresponding evaluation of market failures. A balanced and
credible analysis would require acknowledgement of the profound
contradictions embedded within the history of the "free market" myth;147
the value-laden assumptions and mythologies of neo-classical welfare
economics; 148 the many damning evaluations of privatisation programmes
in various contexts, which show that private actors can also fail in service
provision;149 and continuing fallout from regulatory failures in global
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Langford ed., supra note 34; HENRY SHUE, SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S.
FOREIGN POLICY (1996).
146. Devarajan was the co-lead author of WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT
2004: MAKING SERVICES WORK FOR POOR PEOPLE (2003). The latter report, World Development
Report 2004, was somewhat schizophrenic on the role of public service provision and perhaps
overly enthusiastic about the potential of markets; however it notably avoided the extreme
proposition that the private sector should be doing everything. For a critique, see Tim Kessler,
Review of the 2004 World Development Report "Making Services Work for Poor People,"
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ASSOCIATES (Oct. 8, 2003), available at
http://ideaswebsite.org/news/oct2003/print/print018003_TimKessler.htm.
147. See RODRIK, supra note 41 (tracing the history and contemporary legacies of Keynesian
economic thought and the idea of the regulated market, and noting the contradictions between
free market dogma and the history of industrial policy and state-supported economic
development in Europe, the U.S.A., Asia and elsewhere).
148. Daniel Seymour & Jonathan Pincus, Human Rights and Economics: The Conceptual Basis
for their Complementarity, 26 DEV. POL. REV. 387, 390-92 and 399-400 (2008). The tendency of so-
called "softer" social sciences (including in the field of economics) to seek objectivity and
predictiveness through mathematical precision is known as "physics envy." See Andrew W. Lo
& Mark T. Mueller, Warning: Physics Envy May Be Hazardous to Your Wealth, QUANTITATIVE
FINANCE PAPERS, Working Paper (Mar. 19, 2010), available at
http://arxiv.org/PS-cache/arxiv/pdf/1003/1003.2688v3.pdf.
149. Of course this is not to disparage private provision of services, but rather, to
underscore the complexity of the challenge of justifying the optimal public/private model for
a given sector in particular circumstances. For a flavour of the controversies and outcomes of
recent evaluations, see Bretton Woods Project, World Bank's Privatisation Approach to Health
Services Fails to Deliver, BRETTON WOODS UPDATE No. 75 (Apr. 5 2011), available at
http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-567917; and World Health Organisation, Closing the
Gap in a Generation: Health Equity Through Action on the Social Determinants of Health, Final
Report of the Commission on the Social Determinants of Health (2008) at 132-44,
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financial, energy, commodities and other markets in recent times,
demanding, at a minimum, capable regulatory states.150 Indeed, even prior
to the 2008 global financial crisis, a former director of the IMF's Economics
Department called attention to the unacceptable degree of abstraction to
which the "complete markets" model has led us, arguing that in the real
world of asymmetric information, rights violations and weak institutions, a
better starting point for economic analysis would be to "assume
anarchy"!151
Free market ideology, the unwarranted downgrading of public action,
and simplistic assumptions about the anti-market bias of human rights
suggest what behavioural economists call "over-confidence bias" or
"Pygmalion complex" in psychological terms -a state in which we become
intoxicated by our own disciplinary perspective, over-estimate our
analytical rigour, and fail to be sufficiently self-critical or humble in the face
of deep complexity. 15 2 It may also indicate "confirmation bias," which is the
tendency to discount contradictory data and remain committed to original
assumptions despite conflicting evidence. 153 Dani Rodrik draws a
distinction within economics between "hedgehogs" who believe in the
singular idea that freeing up markets is always the right solution no matter
what the context, and "foxes" who embrace complexity and believe the
devil is in the detail.'5 In Rodrik's view "[an honest practitioner of
academic economics should respond with a blank stare when asked what
the implications of his work are for policy. 'That depends on so many other
things,' would be the appropriate answer ... When the hedgehog's stylized
models become the basis for one grand narrative, the world needs to run
for cover." 155
C. Confusing Means with Ends-Human Rights As Inputs To Growth
Objectives
http:/ / whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/ 2008/9789241563703_eng.pdf (highlighting adverse
distributional impacts attributed to excessive privatisation, commodification and
commercialisation of health services); see also U.N. Doc. A/HRC/15/31, Jun. 29, 2010 (an
authoritative and nuanced analysis of the topic of private sector participation in the delivery of
water and sanitation services); TONY JUDT, TLL FARES THE LAND 188-92 (2010) (a deeper
philosophical reflection).
150. RODRICK, supra note 41, at 237.
151. See RAGHURAM RAJAN, ASSUME ANARCHY? WHY AN ORTHODOX ECONOMIC MODEL
MIGHT NOT BE BEST GUIDE FOR POLICY, FIN. & DEV 56 (Sept. 2004), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2004/09/pdf/straight.pdf. In contrast to the
confident nostrums of neo-classical economics, Rajan's injunction is consistent with John
Maynard Keynes' insistence upon the essential unpredictability of human affairs. See Tony
Judt, What is Living and What is Dead in a Social Democracy?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 17, 2009 -
Jan. 13, 2010, at 86.
152. Jerome Groopman, Health Care: Who Knows Best? N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 11-24, 2010, at
12, 13.
153. Id.
154. RODRICK, supra note 41, at 114-23. The hedgehog and fox metaphor is attributed to the
Greek lyric poet Archilochus (Seventh Century BC): "The fox knows many things, but the
hedgehog knows one big thing."
155. Id. at 134.
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The final and perhaps most obvious problem with the "value-added"
challenge lies in the question-begging assumptions buried within it: value-
added in terms of what? In posing the value-added question, we do not
always explicitly disclose our frame of reference. Should the legitimacy and
relevance, or "added value," of human rights depend upon their
contribution to economic growth, as many influential voices have argued?
For example, former Lead Economist Jean-Pierre Chauffour, in the World
Bank's International Trade Department, has argued for a limited set of
"economic freedoms" and civil and political rights, the latter based upon
the Freedom House indices, as, supposedly, empirically proven
prerequisites for sustained economic growth drawn from a sample of one
hundred countries over a thirty-year period.156 By contrast, so-called
"entitlement rights," the stuff of the MDGs, are negatively associated with
economic growth, as they imply greater government intervention, which is
simplistically assumed to automatically restrict growth.157 A detailed
review of this strongly "minimal state" libertarian thesis is beyond the
scope of this article,158 but appears difficult to reconcile with the policies of
the faster growing economies in recent history. From the industrializing
Global North in the early twentieth century through to the so-called "Asian
Tigers," economic rises and recoveries have relied as much upon active
industrial policy, labour market regulation and (in Malaysia's case) capital
controls, as upon the magic of the marketplace alone.159 Indeed, neo-liberal
156. JEAN PIERRE CHAUFFOUR, THE POWER OF FREEDOM: UNITING HUMAN RIGHTS AND
DEVELOPMENT 31-48, 77-85, 131-33 (2009). It is worth noting that the U.S. government funds
seventy-five per cent of Freedom House's budget. See Nikhil K. Dutta, Accountability in the
Generation of Governance Indicators, 22 FLA. J. INT'L L. 401, 458 (2010). Some critics describe
Freedom House as a "conservative American think tank," or in certain cases even a "right-
wing propaganda agency." JOHN D. NAGLE, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE POLITICS 95
(1985). See also EDWARD S. HERMAN & FRANK BRODHEAD, DEMONSTRATION ELECTIONS 7 (1984).
More specifically, researchers have claimed that Freedom House's conservative bias has
undermined the reliability of its country ratings. See Kenneth A. Bollen, Political Rights and
Political Liberties in Nations: An Evaluation of Human Rights Measures, 1950 to 1984, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND STATISTICS 188, 205 (Thomas P. Jabine & Richard P. Claude eds., 1992).
157. According to Chauffour, protecting certain limited economic, civil and political
"freedoms" demands an effective but limited state. "Since economic freedom is essentially
restricted by the extent of state coercion (usually by means of taxation and regulation), the
scope of the state should not trespass beyond the level necessary for citizens to protect and
maintain liberty itself." Chauffour, supra note 156, at 85. However, the fact that liberty, as well
as entitlements, depend on taxes, is not sufficiently recognised. Cf. STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES (1999).
158. For a recent critical review, see Gyan Basnet, Book Review 11 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 206
(2011) (challenging Chauffour's conceptual framework, depth of human rights research and
normative justifications, and practical implications of the author's central theoretical precepts
relating to capital accumulation and the wealth creation process); see also Stephen P. Marks, The
Past and Future of the Separation of Rights into Categories, 24 MD. J. INT'L L. 209, 240 (2009)
(rebutting Chauffour's suggested hierarchy of rights), Philip Alston, Resisting the Merger and
Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to Petersmann, 13 E.J. INT'L L. 815 (2002) (for a
comprehensive and powerful rejection of libertarian assumptions about social rights in the
context of trade law).
159. See RODRIK, supra note 41, at 16-17 (noting the complementary role of the market and
the state in the history of economic globalization and the fact that governments have in fact
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orthodoxy was what made the financial crisis worse for some of these
countries in the first place.160 Those countries that have benefited most from
free-market globalization are those that have embraced its precepts only
selectively.161 The greater and more tragic irony is that countries pursuing
neoliberal policies aimed at diminishing state intervention in the economy
have often done so through vigorous state intervention with authoritarian
tendencies.162
These obvious contradictions bring to mind the over-confidence and
confirmation biases discussed in Section IV.B, supra, and strong echoes of
the "growth is good for the poor" debates of the early 2000s, which
assumed that focusing only on economic growth would be sufficient to
improve human development. In 1999, two World Bank economists, David
Dollar and Aart Kraay, published research purporting to show that the
incomes of the poor rise in tandem with overall growth, suggesting that the
best way to raise their incomes is to stimulate growth. 6 3 Their research
found a ready audience among neo-classical economists but a decidedly
cooler and more critical reception elsewhere, on methodological and
ideological grounds.164 Tellingly, when forced to confront the complexity
and uncertainty of the causal relationships between growth and poverty
expanded along with markets in industrialised economies in order to provide social protection
and other institutional prerequisites for a functioning open economy); ROBERT WADE,
GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN
INDUSTRIALISATION 297-331 (2003) (providing an authoritative and nuanced analysis of the
complex interactions between the State and the market in Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and
Hong Kong); JOSEPH STIGLITz, GLOBALISATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 89-132 (1999) (arguing
that neo-liberal economic policies contributed to the East Asian crisis in the late 1990s). See also
supra, note 147 and accompanying text. Chauffour's short discussion "The Scope of the State"
freely cites libertarian thinkers such as Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek, but strangely
fails to engage with Wade's seminal work "Governing the Market," resulting in a skewed
portrayal of the East Asian development experience. Chauffour, supra note 156, at 85-89.
160. STIGLITz, supra note 159.
161. RODRIK, supra note 41, at 3-46, 142-49.
162. Asa Laurell, Globalizacion y reforma de estado, in SADDE, EQUIDADE E GENERO: UM
DESAFIO AS POLITICAS PUBLICAS 43 (A.M. Costa, E. Merchan-Hamann & D. Tajer, eds., 2000),
cited in Alica Ely Yamin, Oscar Parra-Vera & Camila Gianella, Colombia: Judicial Protection of the
Right to Health: An Elusive Promise?, inYamin & Gloppen eds., supra note 34, at 197.
163. David Dollar & Aart Kraay, Growth is Good for the Poor, 7(3) J. ECON. GROWTH 195
(2000).
164. See, e.g., Howard White & Edward Anderson, Growth Versus Distribution: Does the
Pattern of Growth Matter? 19 DEV. POL'Y REV. 267 (2001) (criticising Dollar and Kraay's
methodology and suggesting instead that a proper interpretation of the data supports
redistribution of resources in favour of the poorest income quintile); Andrew Sumner,
Epistemology and "Evidence" in Development Studies: A Review of Dollar and Kraay, 25(6) THIRD
WORLD Q. 1167 (2004) (critiquing the methodology and supposed "evidence basis" of Dollar
and Kraay's thesis); Mark Weisbrot, Dean Baker, Robert Naiman & Gila Net, Growth May be
Good for the Poor - But are IMF and World Bank Policies Good for Growth? Center for Economic
and Policy Research (May 11, 2001), available at http://ces.univ-
parisl.fr/membre/Poncet/EIM/Critic%202%2Weisbrot%2Baker%20Naiman%2ONeta.pdf
(highlighting a range of data errors, the complexity of the relationship between growth and
poverty reduction in practice, and the precious few statistically significant causal connections
that can be drawn beyond the general positive correlation between economic growth and
incomes of the poor).
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reduction, Kraay conceded that based on the available data his paper could
equally have been entitled "Growth is Good for the Rich"!165 Controversies
of this kind underscore the contested and potentially subjective character of
economic justifications for both growth and human rights, even when
supported by putatively "hard" econometric evidence. Even if the growth
and poverty reduction relationship were clearer, suggesting that we should
prioritise growth as a policy objective, there is simply no consensus on the
policies necessary to achieve growth in different country situations. 166 But
more fundamentally, for many heterodox economists and human rights
and development practitioners, valuing human rights as mere inputs to
economic growth trivialises and instrumentalises human rights and ignores
central tenets of human rights theory and lessons from claiming rights in
practice. It also obscures critical distinctions between the deontological and
consequentialist conceptual foundations of human rights and economics,
and confuses and arguably inverts the proper direction of the inquiry.167
The empirical arguments about economic growth and human rights are
evolving and contested; however, the available evidence does seem to
support a number of headline propositions. The first of these is that while
economic growth strategies have lifted many people out of poverty, they
have often failed to redress the situation of the poorest of the poor and have
even exacerbated existing inequalities. Son and Kakwani found that during
237 growth spells in eighty countries, only twenty-three per cent led to pro-
poor outcomes.168 Conversely, many poorer countries have demonstrated
that significant human rights progress is possible even with limited
resources, through political commitment and re-prioritising public
spending.169
Second, an analysis of development experience over the last several
decades shows remarkably low correlations between economic growth and
human development (comprising a subset of human rights), with cases
where economic growth did not advance human development, and
conversely, where there were impressive gains in human development
without consistent strong growth.170 Third, there is no consistent
relationship between economic growth and the achievement of the MDGs,
more specifically. In a recent sampling of country progress in Asia and the
165. Sumner, supra note 164 at 1177 n. 21.
166. See, e.g., RODRIK, supra note 41, at 174; WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
GROWTH: ECONOMISTW' ADVENTURES AND MISADVENTURES IN THE TROPIcS 21-140 (2001). The
author is grateful to Varun Gauri for discussions on this theme.
167. For example, by way of analogy, Amartya Sen has argued that certain human
freedoms are constitutive, or a defining attribute of development. See AMARTYA SEN,
DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM (1999). The question of the "added value" of those freedoms to
development is self-evidently circular, at best, under this conception of development.
168. Hyun Son & Nanak Kakwani, Global Estimates ofPro-Poor Growth, Int'l Pol'y Center for
Inclusive Growth, (Working Paper No. 31 Oct. 2006), available at http://www.ipc-
undp.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper31.pdf.
169. UNDP, supra note 21, at 45-64; Susan Randolph, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr & Terra Lawson,
Economic and Social Rights Fulfilment Index: Country Scores and Rankings, The Hum. Rts.
Institute, Univ. of Conn., Economic Working Papers Series. Working Paper No. 11 (Sep. 2009).
170. UNDP, supra note 21, at 45-64.
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Pacific, for example, a decrease in income poverty was found to be strongly,
but not uniformly, associated with economic growth, but there was a much
weaker relationship with infant and maternal mortality, and only little
impact on education targets.171 Fourth, growth that exacerbates inequalities
cannot be considered sustainable, and may even generate or fuel violent
conflict.172 The extent to which growth translates to poverty reduction
depends, among other things, on existing levels of inequality: the more
unequal a society, the less impact that improved growth will have on
reducing poverty. 73 Higher income inequalities within countries has also
been correlated with higher poverty headcount, higher unemployment,
higher crime, lower average health, weaker property rights, elite capture of
public services and rule-setting forums, and lower social mobility.174
Finally, suggestions that democratic transitions may undermine economic
performance or that growth should precede democracy seem myopic, self-
serving and anecdotal, at best.175 Empirical studies have affirmed the
importance of political rights for economic growth.176 Conversely, higher
income inequalities within countries have been associated with slower
transitions to democratic regimes and more fragile democracies.'7 Lessons
from the Arab Spring (whether or not democratic reforms are consolidated)
may contribute valuably to our knowledge of these complex relationships,
subject to the inevitable methodological limitations and problems in
generalizing across country situations.
Correspondingly, there is increasing evidence indicating that countries
will enjoy better opportunities for economic growth if people are able to
171. UNITED NATIONS & ASIA DEVELOPMENT BANK, A FUTURE WITHIN REACH: REGIONAL
PARTNERSHIPS FOR THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 41 (2008).
The notable exception to the correlation between growth performance and the income poverty
target was Cambodia where, based upon 2008 data, there was only a one percent reduction in
income poverty for every ten percentage points in growth.
172. See Stewart ed., supra note 65; Andrew G. Berg & Jonathan D. Ostry, Inequality and
Unsustainable Growth: Two Sides of the Same Coin? I.M.F. STAFF DISCUSSION NOTE 11/08, Apr. 8,
2011, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2011/sdnlos.pdf.
173. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006: EQUITY AND DEVELOPMENT 86
(2006).
174. See Wade, supra note 41, at 674-81.
175. Dani Rodrik & Romain Wacziarg, Do Democratic Transitions Produce Bad Economic
Outcomes, (Working Paper, Dec. 2004), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/drodrik/
Research%20papers/democracy.pdf. The authors observe that cross-country regression
analyses typically find that democracies are associated with no statistically significant changes
in economic growth, but with significant reductions in economic volatility. However these
studies do not help us understand what happens during and in the immediate aftermath of
transitions to democracy. Using annual frequency data to examine the within-country effects
of democratization on economic growth, Rodrik and Wacziarg contend that "major
democratic transitions have, if anything, a positive effect on economic growth in the short run."
Id. at 2. According to the authors, "this is especially true for the poorest countries of the world
and those that are marked by sharp ethnic divisions. Democratizations tend to follow periods
of low growth rather than precede them. Moreover, democratic transitions are associated with
a decline in growth volatility."
176. See, e.g., ROBERT J. BARRO, DETERMINANTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: A CROSS-COUNTRY
EMPIRICAL STUDY 59 (1997).
177. Wade, supra note 41, at 675.
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enjoy their socio-economic rights. For example, between thirty to fifty
percent of Asia's economic growth from 1965 to 1990 has been attributed by
the World Health Organisation to improvements in reproductive health
and reduction in infant and child mortality and fertility rates.'78
Conversely, the failure to invest in basic social and economic rights can be
very costly indeed; for example, maternal and newborn deaths slow growth
and lead to global productivity losses of $15 billion each year.179 The World
Bank has estimated that economic losses from the failure to invest in basic
sanitation ranged from two to seven per cent of national GDP, in a recent
sampling of Southeast Asian countries.18 0
Of course, none of this is to impugn economic growth per se, far from it.
Buffeted by global economic and financial crises, it is clear that many states
will need to improve growth performance in order to create jobs and
achieve sustainable improvements in social conditions. Member States at
the MDGs Summit highlighted economic growth as an important condition
for sustainable and equitable development, and committed themselves to
the goal of "sustained, inclusive equitable" economic growth. But implicit
in this recognition is the proposition that growth in and of itself is not
sufficient, and will not automatically translate to human rights
improvements. To conclude otherwise confuses means with ends. If
internationally recognized human rights are an imperfect proxy for the
good life, economic growth, alone, is far less so.18 ' Growth should always
be understood as a means towards the ends of social justice, human dignity
178. WHO AND THE PARTNERSHIP FOR MATERNAL, NEWBORN AND CHILD HEALTH,
MATERNAL, NEWBORN AND CHILD HEALTH NETWORK FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC: INVESTING IN
MATERNAL, NEWBORN AND CHILD HEALTH - THE CASE FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, Geneva
(2009). More generally, see PETER LINDERT, GROWING PUBLIC: SOCIAL SPENDING AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH SINCE THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (2004) (arguing that, contrary to neo-liberal
ideology, social spending has contributed to rather than inhibited economic growth).
179. WHO AND THE PARTNERSHIP FOR MATERNAL, NEWBORN AND CHILD HEALTH, Supra
note 188, at 3.
180. WORLD BANK, ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF SANITATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: A FOUR-
COUNTRY STUDY CONDUCTED IN CAMBODIA, INDONESIA, THE PHILIPPINES AND VIET NAM UNDER
THE ECONOMICS OF SANITATION INITIATIVE (ESI), 34 (Feb. 2008),
http://www.wsp.org/wsp/sites/wsp.org/files/publications/SanitationImpactSynthesis_2.
pdf. See also WHO & U.N.-Water, U.N.-WATER GLOBAL ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF SANITATION
AND DRINKING WATER (2010) at 9 (summarizing economic benefits, as well as costs).
181. There is extensive literature on the limitations of per capita Gross Domestic Product
(GDP, the sum total of the goods and services produced in a year) as a measure of a society's
well-being, including within the emerging science of "happiness" studies. See, e.g., RICHARD
LAYARD, HAPPINESS: LESSONS FROM A NEW SCIENCE (2005) (exposing weaknesses in
conventional economic theory through clinical insights from psychology and behavioural
economics, and challenging neo-classical assumptions about market behaviour and the fixed
and individualised nature of preference formation). Among the more significant and
consistent findings is that experience of day-to-day happiness is relational, and less correlated
with income than is subjective life evaluation. See Daniel Kahneman & Angus Deaton, High
Income Improves Evaluation of Life but not Emotional Well-Being, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, Sept. 21, 2010, available at www.pnas.org. See also the final
report of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission at http://www.stiglitz-sen-
fitoussi.fr/documents/rapportanglais.pdf (proposing ways of measuring multi-dimensional
well-being beyond the per capita GDP proxy).
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and well-being, rather than the ends of a sound economic policy, or as a
proxy indicator of good governance or fiscal and policy effort.
D. The Relevance and Impacts of Human Rights on Public Policy and
Service Delivery
The preceding discussion suggests three important weaknesses in the
"value added" challenge. But, more specifically and pertinently, what does
the evidence say about the impacts of human rights, and social rights
(commensurate with the MDGs), on human well-being? And how do
human rights standards, principles and accountability mechanisms
influence policy and service delivery, relevant to the MDGs? This Section
first examines the available empirical evidence on the impacts of social
rights litigation - as one of the better-studied theatres and modes of human
rights claiming - on resource allocations in the social sectors and human
development outcomes. While the more authoritative studies are relatively
recent, and while the data and methodological gaps are considerable, the
discussion shows that legalised human rights claims have now become an
increasingly prominent feature in policymaking. Taking account of this
evidence, such as it is, this Section then explores broader currents of
thinking about the ways in which human rights standards, principles and
accountability mechanisms can influence policymaking and service
delivery, noting tensions as well as possible points of articulation with
economic perspectives.
1. Impacts of social rights litigation-what does the evidence say?
There are many levels at which one could address an inquiry into the
outcomes of human rights claims. Human rights claims are commonly
asserted through a range of means, such as social mobilisation, political
campaigning, and social accountability mechanisms 82 at national and sub-
national levels, as well as formal court claims and accountability
mechanisms under global or regional human rights treaties. Surprisingly,
comparatively little of this wide field of practice has been subjected to
serious quantitative investigation. 183 Nevertheless, there is an emerging
comparative literature on the impacts of social rights adjudication in
national court systems from which one may draw certain illuminating
albeit nuanced conclusions on the relevance of human rights to
182. These include public expenditure reviews, social audits, "community scorecard"
initiatives and suchlike, wherein individuals and communities are able to hold governments
and private authorities to account for service delivery.
183. See, e.g., Gauri, supra note 126. Gauri examines three kinds of redress procedures -
administrative venues within government agencies, independent institutions outside
government departments, and courts. Gauri remarks on the paucity of policy research on
"redress" or grievance procedures in service delivery, id. at 2, while noting nevertheless the
importance of "rights consciousness" as a prerequisite to the effectiveness of legalized rights
claims and judicial review, id. at 7.
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policymaking, with the strong caveat that this is but one small part of the
overall human rights accountability picture.
Claiming basic social services as a matter of human right has made an
empirically observable difference in many countries, although the
conclusions from the more credible studies are necessarily nuanced.M
Disentangling cause and effect, and quantifying outcomes, are notoriously
difficult in this context. The complexity of the analytical and interpretive
challenges and counterfactuals is compounded in predatory states and
societies marked by long legacies of deeply entrenched discrimination,
where political institutions are corrupt and where litigation - whatever the
weaknesses in the court system - may be among the few avenues for
expressing grievances. The distributional impacts of litigated human rights
claims must be interpreted in this light. 85 Judicial decisions can have both
positive and negative (intended or unintended) effects, both directly and
indirectly, as well as systemic effects beyond the parties to a dispute. Often
the decision itself may be of secondary importance in the context of a
broader social movement and political strategy for social change. Causation
and attribution are especially challenging in such complex multivariate
regressions, particularly over a period of time sufficient to evaluate social
outcomes.
Subject to these caveats, the record to some extent seems to confirm the
intuition that lawyers and formal court processes may sometimes be part of
the problem rather than the solution for those suffering greatest
discrimination, particularly in many poorer countries. In some countries
and for some issues it seems that human rights claims through the formal
court system may have distorted public spending towards the middle and
lower-middle classes, thereby possibly exacerbating existing inequalities. 8 6
184. The most authoritative and illuminating empirical investigations of the effects of
social rights litigation are Gauri & Brinks eds., supra note 34, and Yamin & Gloppen eds., supra
note 34. For a wide-ranging and thorough comparative jurisprudential analysis of human
rights claims, see Langford ed., supra note 34, and for an exploration of social rights litigation in
juxtaposition with democratic politics, see COURTS AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION IN NEW
DEMOCRACIES: AN INSTITUTIONAL VOICE FOR THE POOR? (Roberto Gargarella, Pilar Domingo &
Theunis Roux, eds., 2006).
185. Ottar Maested, Lise Rakner & Octavio L. Motta Ferraz, Assessing the Impact of Health
Rights Litigation: A Comparative Analysis of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, India and South
Africa, in Yamin & Gloppen eds., supra note 34, at 296.
186. Right to health litigation in Brazil, India and Colombia has been questioned on this
basis. See, e.g., Octavio Ferraz, The Right to Health in the Courts of Brazil: Worsening Health
Inequities? 11 HEALTH & HUM. RmI. 33 (2009); Daniel M. Brinks & Varun Gauri, A New Policy
Landscape: Legalising Social and Economic Rights in the Developing World, in Gauri & Brinks eds.,
supra note 34, at 309, 314; Ottar Maested, Lise Rakner & Octavio L. Motta Ferraz, supra note 185,
at 274, 299. The latter authors note that the distributional impacts of health rights litigation
depends upon a range of factors, such as the type of claim (individual or collective), the
judicial system (civil or common law, access to courts, interpretation of the right to health),
and various attributes of the health system itself. Ottar Mested, Lise Rakner & Octavio L.
Motta Ferraz, supra note 185, at 300. On the issue of inequalities, the authors conclude that "the
litigation wave has not yet matured to a stage where its long-term effects can be properly
judged," but that "with regard to those cases that seem to have increased inequities, in a
historical perspective, rights have always been first claimed by the middle classes and later
extended to the general population." Id. at 300-01.
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The Colombian Constitutional Court famously has issued a raft of
programmatic orders in social rights cases with potentially significant
budget implications, provoking concerns about negative externalities and
the proper limits of the judicial role. 87 However, proving failure can be as
hard as proving success. On the specific issue of the distributional impacts
of legal claims on health budgets, Yamin notes that "we simply do not have
robust evidence to conclude that the funds for paying for litigated care are
systematically coming at the expense of important preventative public
health measures or the infrastructure of the health system itself." 88
Conversely, in their recent empirical study of health and education
claims in Brazil, Indonesia, India, South Africa, and Nigeria, Gauri and
Brinks concluded that human rights law has become a "permanent and
prominent part of the policymaking landscape," and that "legalizing
demand for [socio-economic] rights might well have averted tens of
thousands of deaths [in the five countries studied] and has likely enriched
the lives of millions of others."189 In South Africa approximately one
million life years were estimated to have been saved through court-ordered
access to low-cost medication to prevent mother-to-child transmission of
HIV.190 While courts are hardly the most progressive forums, and are as
susceptible to elite capture as any institution, public interest litigation and
the indirect effects of individual claims have been shown to bring
substantial benefits for the poor in particular cases. 191 The results of social
rights jurisprudence have tracked constitutional rights to an appreciable
187. See, e.g., Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes & Diana Rodriguez Franco, Aciertos e insuficiencias de
la sentencia T-760 de 2008: implicaciones para el derecho a la salud en Colombia, 18 OBSERVTAORIO DE
LA SECURIDAD SOCIAL (2008). For a response to some of these concerns, see Alicia Ely Yamin &
Oscar Parra Vera, Judicial Protection of the Right to Health in Colombia: From Social Demands to
Individual Claims to Public Debates, 33(2) HAsTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 101-30 (2010); Yamin,
Parra-Vera & Gianelli, supra note 162, at 116, 120-22, 124-25, 127 (In relation to the Colombian
Constitutional Court's most ambitious judgment (case no. T-760/08)). The latter authors note
that, contrary to popular assumptions, "the Court did not seek to legislate health policy or
displace the executive branch. Rather, it carefully followed what had been envisioned in prior
legislation and called for the political branches of government to undertake the functions that
correspond to them. Also, critically, the Court attempted to foster a broad-based debate about
the contours of a right to health care in Colombia's highly plural society." Yamin, Parra-Vera
& Gianelli supra note 162, at 127.
188. Alicia Ely Yamin, Power, Suffering and Courts: Reflections on Promoting Health Rights
through Judicialization, in Yamin & Gloppen, eds., supra note 34, at 352-53.
189. Brinks & Gauri, supra note 186, at 303. For an insightful analysis of the preconditions
for the effective adjudication of social rights claims, see Malcolm Langford, The Justiciability of
Social Rights: From Practice to Theory, in Langford ed., supra note 34, at 3-45.
190. Ole Frithjof Norheim & Siri Gloppen, Litigating for Medicines: How Can We Assess
Impact on Health Outcomes?, in Yamin & Gloppen eds., supra note 34, at 320.
191. Brinks & Gauri, supra note 186, at 305, 338-40. By way of illustration the authors
estimate that "about 350,000 Indian girls a year are newly enrolling in school as a result of the
indirect effects of the right-to-food litigation" in that country, id. at 328. By way for further
example, "[rieports in Costa Rica trace an 80% decline in AIDS mortality to the constitutional
chamber's decisions to mandate the provision of ARVs. Moreover, the mere possibility of
judicial enforcement can produce different political behavior and opportunities for negotiation
for social movements." Alicia Ely Yamin, Beyond Compassion: The Central Role of Accountability
in Applying a Human Rights Approach to Health, 10(2) HEALTH & HUM. Rs. 1,6 (2008).
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degree,192 suggesting the instrumental importance of explicit formal human
rights protections. And while national and local accountability mechanisms
are in principle the most proximate and accessible forums for redress for
most people, recent statistical and case study research suggests, with
certain important qualifications, that the ratification of human rights
treaties may lead to better human rights practices on average. The research
covers areas of specific relevance to the MDGs in the fields of health,
reproductive rights, education, and child rights.193
But the relevance of human rights to development is not, or should not
be, straitjacketed within the evolving contours of the empirical debates.
This is not an objection to "evidence" per se, of course, which is
indispensible for good policymaking. Rather, it is a comment on the faith
we place in the predictive ambitions of hard science, within a far wider and
more complex normative and value-based framework of decision-making,
whether those values are explicit or implicit. As Gauri and Brinks remind
us, "We should not .. . allow scepticism born of methodological rigidity to
convert us into the proverbial drunkard who loses his keys at the doorstep
but searches under the lamppost where the light is." 194 The objectivity of
192. Brinks & Gauri, supra note 186, at 317; Langford, supra note 189, at 44. The supra-
constitutional status of human rights treaties has been identified as an enabling factor in Costa
Rica's social rights jurisprudence. See Bruce M. Wilson, Costa Rica: Health Rights Litigation:
Causes and Consequences, in Yamin & Gloppen, supra note 34, at 142.
193. BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC
POLITICS (2009). The observed effects vary in accordance with the human rights in question
and the existing degree of mobilisation around that right, and are more observable in so-called
"transitional" states rather than stable regimes (whether democratic or autocratic), among
other variables. For comparative empirical models and analytical approaches see Varun Gauri,
The Cost of Complying with Human Rights Treaties: The Convention on the Rights of the Child and
Basic Immunization, 6 REV. INT'L ORG. 33-56 (2011) (using Simmons' "domestic politics theory of
compliance" where the (modest and partial) observed effects of CRC ratification are attributed
largely to "agenda-setting influences" among bureaucratic entrepreneurs and relative fiscal
costs of compliance); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Kiyoteru Tsutsui & John W. Meyer,
International Human Rights Law and the Politics of Legitimation: Repressive States and Human Rights
Treaties, 23 INT'L Soc. 115-41 (2008) (pointing to the level of democracy and mobilisation as the
major determinants of treaty compliance); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui,
Human Rights Practices in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises, 110 AM. J. SOC.
1373-1411 (2005). For an analysis of norm socialisation from an international relations
standpoint, see RYAN GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN
RIGHTS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2011); Ryan
Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 14 E.J.I.L. 171-83 (2003).
For other more qualitative studies exploring the influence and domestication of international
human rights treaty obligations, see Alexis Palmer et al., Does Ratification of Human-Rights
Treaties Have Effects on Population Health? 373 LANCET 1987-92 (June 6, 2009); PHILIP ALSTON &
JOHN TOBIN WITH MAC DARROW, LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: AN
INDEPENDENT STUDY OF SOME KEY LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE IMPACT OF THE
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD, UNICEF Innocenti Insight No. 10 (2005); Cf. Oona
Hathaway, Testing Conventional Wisdom, 14 E.J.I.L. 185-200 (2003); CHRISTOF HEYNS & FRANS
VILJOEN, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES ON THE DOMESTIC
LEVEL (2002)).
194. Varun Gauri & Daniel Brinks, Introduction: The Elements of Legalization and the
Triangular Shape of Social and Economic Rights, in Gauri & Brinks eds., supra note 34, at 25. The
authors were commenting on the empirical challenges in quantifying the indirect benefits
flowing from the legalisation of social rights claims.
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quantitative methods195 and "evidence-based" policymaking is often over-
stated. Statistical assumptions may be marshalled to support many
conflicting ideologies and policy preferences. 196 Some of the more
prominent and influential development policy agendas, including the failed
policies of the structural adjustment era, can hardly be said to have been
evidence-based, even though they were at one time widely accepted and
continue to be revived, including in the MDGs context.197 It is important to
know, and as far as possible quantify, the respects in which human rights
do or do not contribute to other important public policy goals, or at least
those policy goals that are more obviously amenable to definition without
reference to human rights. But commitments to eliminate malnutrition,
child labour, violence against women and avoidable maternal deaths
should not depend upon empirical justifications expressed in terms of
contributions to development or economic growth. Whatever the empirical
arguments, from normative or deontological perspectives, investing in and
respecting these and other vital human rights is justified on moral or legal
grounds, without more.
The international human rights framework does not, self-evidently,
occupy the entire field of emancipatory potential.198 The universality of
internationally recognised human rights is legitimately a matter of vigorous
theoretical and empirical debate, 199 and the meanings of human rights in
195. Definitions of quantitative, as distinct from qualitative, methods of analysis are many
and varied. However, in general terms, "[alnalyses which are based on non-numerical
information, which are specific and targeted in their population coverage, which in their
design require active involvement from the population covered, which use inductive methods
of inference and which operate in the broad framework of social sciences other than
economics, we tend to label as 'Qualitative.' Those which are based on numerical information,
which are general in their population coverage, which require only passive involvement of the
population covered, which use deductive (usually statistical) methods of inference and which
rely on the neo-classical economic framework, we tend to label as 'Quantitative.'" Ravi
Kanbur, Q-Squared? A Commentary on Qualitative and Quantitative Poverty Appraisal, in QUAL-
QUANT QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE POVERTY APPRAISAL: COMPLEMENTARITIES, TENSIONS
AND THE WAY FORWARD, 1, 7 Cornell University, (Ravi Kanbur, ed.) Mar. 11-12, 2001, 7,
available at http://www.arts.cornell.edu/poverty/kanbur/QQZ.pdf.
196. See, Vandemoortele & Delamonica, supra note 15, at 62; and discussion supra Sections
IV.A-C.
197. UNDP, supra note 21, at 46-50; see also supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text, and
discussion supra Sections IV.B-C.
198. There is a vast Critical Legal Studies literature on this point. See, e.g., Peter Gabel,
Symposium: A Critique of Rights, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the
Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1984). For thoughtful critiques of human rights'
hegemonic tendencies, along with the conditions under which their emancipatory potential
may be realised, see James Souter, Emancipation and Domination: Human Rights and Power
Relations, 3(2) J. LAW, POL. & Soc. 140 (2008); Marius Pieterse, Eating Socio-Economic Rights: The
Usefulness of Rights Talk in Alleviating Social Hardship Revisited, 29(3) HUM. RTS. Q. 796 (2007); see
generally Kennedy, supra note 138.
199. See, e.g., SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY (2010) at 217-27
(arguing that a genuine social movement around international human rights arose only the
mid-1970s, in the wake of successive failure of competing "utopian" political projects). Moyn's
thesis has proven controversial; certain key assumptions concerning the evolution and impact
of social rights, pretences of international human rights towards utopianism, the role of
human rights in displacing, sapping or cloaking ideological contests, and privileging of a
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practice are dynamic, evolving and contested.200 It may well be possible to
identify a set of values to which the great majority of individuals and
communities worldwide at a given time would subscribe, 201 but this could
never be captured in a static fashion within a single set of global legal
standards. For those governments that are sincere about implementing their
international human rights treaty commitments, there are often very
significant challenges in translation and norm socialisation.
Similar caveats apply to claiming human rights in practice. While the
legalisation of rights claims has exerted powerful and positive influence in
many cases, as we have seen, empirically verifiable conclusions about
adjudicating rights claims are necessarily tentative and qualified. There
have been many qualitative studies and comparative jurisprudential
analyses of social rights litigation in recent years, but comparatively few
reliable impact studies, embracing relatively few rights. Even for a
particular type of human rights claim within a particular jurisdiction, there
may be limits to which conclusions are generalisable. Successful and pro-
poor rights claims depend on a wide range of factors, including legal and
political opportunity structures. Many of the examples of successful rights
claims have been observed where the claims take place within the context
of wider processes of social and political mobilisation. 202 But disentangling
the causal significance of the various factors involved in vindicating rights
can be challenging, especially when assessing indirect systemic effects of
rights claims over the longer term.203 Similar caveats apply to recent
empirical investigations of the impacts of human rights treaty ratification.
narrow strand of human rights constituting "minimal constraints on responsible politics," can
certainly be challenged. For other criticisms see, e.g., Belinda Cooper, New Birth of Freedom, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/26/books/review/Cooper-t.html.
200. See John Tobin, Seeking to Persuade: A Constructive Approach to Human Rights Treaty
Interpretation, 23 HARV. HUM. Rrs. J. 1 (2010) (critiquing textual or formalist approaches to legal
interpretation of human rights treaties); Jeremy Perelman & Katharine G. Young, Rights as
Footprints: A New Metaphor for Contemporary Human Rights Practice, 9(1) NW J. INT'L HUM. RTS.
27 (2010) (articulating a sociological perspective in which meanings of human rights are
grounded in communities' realities and constructed from collective memory).
201. See, e.g., DEEPA NARAYAN ET AL., VOICES OF THE POOR: CAN ANYBODY HEAR US?
(2000); VOICES OF THE POOR: CRYING OUT FOR CHANGE (Deepa Narayan, Robert Chambers,
Meera K. Shah & Patti Pettesch eds., 2000); VOICES OF THE POOR: FROM MANY LANDS (Deepa
Narayan & Patti Pettesch eds., 2002) (discussing the results of a multi-country research
initiative and participatory poverty assessments that reveal quite a striking consonance
between experiences of poverty in different countries and regions, and showed the
importance, in particular, of voice and power in people's own definitions of poverty).
202. Langford, supra note 34, at 45; Sharnjeet Parmar & Namita Wahi, India: Citizens, Courts
and the Right to Health: Between Promise and Progress?, in Yamin & Gloppen eds., supra note 34,
at 171; Brinks & Gauri, supra note 186, at 321-22.
203. The studies surveyed in this article suggest that positive indirect effects on
policymaking, for a wider population, have been more commonly observable in common law
jurisdictions, where judges observe precedent (obviating claimants from filing multiple claims
in relation to similar matters), and where the legal infrastructure permits class claims.
"Symbolic" impacts have also been observed in certain cases, relating to both "the redefinition
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None of these nuances appear to have stemmed the tide of human
rights policy statements in bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, nor the
proliferation of human rights-based approaches by a wide range of
development actors at global, national and local levels. This reminds us that
the world will still turn, guided by values, observed experience, and best
available evidence, even without resolving the myriad "unappeasable
ambiguities" in quantitative terms.20 Nevertheless, further empirical work
and evaluation in the above areas will provide valuable inputs into the
longer-term project of ensuring that human rights are valued and
integrated appropriately in development policymaking, including in
connection with the process and design of the post-2015 development
agenda.
2. Comparative contributions of human rights principles and economic
reasoning to policymaking
The preceding analysis, while necessarily nuanced in terms of its
findings on the impacts of human rights claims, and while expressly limited
to just one of many spheres of human rights claiming (viz legal claims
through the formal court system), helps to dispel absolutist assumptions
about the role and contributions of human rights in public policymaking.
Within the constraints and parameters discussed above, international
human rights should be seen not as an extraneous and utopian political
project, but rather, a comparatively objective and feasible framework of
claims and obligations corresponding to minimum substantive guarantees
for a life with dignity, and an increasingly important vocabulary and toolkit
for empowerment. Human rights have tangible - even if not necessarily
prescriptive - implications for development policymaking. The practical
relevance of international human rights in any context will depend on a
great many factors including the degree to which individuals and
communities are aware of their entitlements and can be enabled to voice
their claims, and the existence of effective and accessible administrative,
judicial and other mechanisms hold duty-bearers (usually, but not
exclusively, the state) to account.
While the human rights legal framework itself is not a template or
blueprint for policymaking, it does require that the policy choices and
difficult trade-offs involved in policymaking satisfy minimum procedural
and substantive standards, quite apart from the relative strength of their
empirical claims. Articulating the distinctive principles, channels and
institutional mechanisms through which human rights may positively
influence public policymaking is a quintessentially context-specific
undertaking, in relation to which the jurisprudential lessons surveyed
above are but one dimension. Promoting a deeper and broader dialogue
and appreciation of the techniques of reasoning in the fields of economics
204. The term in quotations was borrowed from a discussion of some of the more
intractable dilemmas of social rights adjudication. See id. at 336.
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and human rights, and their relative contributions to policymaking, will
continue to be a significant challenge during international negotiations
towards the post-2015 development agenda. The fact that the human rights
field is not bound within any particular discipline no doubt complicates the
task.205 There is, nevertheless, extensive literature on this topic, and a
diversity of approaches to consider, drawn from the comparative
jurisprudential studies surveyed in Section IV.D.1, supra, as well as social
sciences, and political and moral theory more generally.
Varun Gauri, for example, argues that there is much in common with a
social rights and economic approach to service delivery, particularly in the
fields of education and health. Both approaches are concerned with
participation, transparency and accountability in service delivery, for
different but to some extent overlapping motives. Certain distinctive policy
consequences do accompany the choice of approach, however. In Gauri's
analysis there are three "important, but not irreconcilable" differences in
social rights and economic policy. The first difference lies in the intrinsic
(rather than instrumental) importance and morally compelling nature of the
mechanisms and processes for the delivery of health and education services
under a rights approach. Second, rights approaches are preoccupied with
distributions in outcomes, which may be evidence of discrimination, rather
than average outcomes. Finally, in Gauri's view, rights approaches are
better able to accommodate "adaptive preferences," defined as "the habit of
individuals subject to deprivation to lower their standards regarding what
they need, want, and deserve." Economics, by contrast, "does not easily
accommodate individuals who do not maximise their own welfare,"
though many solutions proposed by economists do in fact help to improve
information and strengthen service delivery in ways that can change
individuals' sense of what they have and what they deserve. 206
Nevertheless, Gauri is skeptical about the contributions of social rights to
resolving complex trade-offs in public policymaking, given the
"incommensurability" (or indivisibility and inter-relatedness) of rights. 207
Gauri suggests that resolving competing rights claims in a large population
is "inevitably an activity without a formula, and one that relies on
judgement guided by principle," 208 although his rejection of social rights as
"binding constraints" on policymaking 209 may be unduly pessimistic in
light of subsequent research into social rights claims in developing
205. See Peter Rosenblum, Teaching Human Rights: Ambivalent Activism, Multiple Discourses,
and Lingering Dilemmas, 15 HARV. HUM., RTs. J. 301-15 (Spring 2002) (discussing inter-
disciplinary challenges and other complexities involved in teaching human rights).
206. Varun Gauri, Social Rights and Economics: Claims to Health Care and Education in
Developing Countries, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS MUTUAL
REINFORCEMENT 61-83, 79-80 (Philip Alston & Mary Robinson eds., 2005).
207. Id. at 80-81. See also Yamin, supra note 188, at 364-65 (discussing the false
consciousness problem and importance of human rights in the context of empowering
individuals to demand change).
208. Gauri, supra note 206, at 81.
209. Id. at 71.
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countries. 210
Other commentators have since gone further in attempting to reconcile
the economics and human rights perspectives. Seymour and Pincus offer an
engaging reconciliation of decision-making principles drawn from neo-
classical welfare economics and human rights theory.211 The authors
explore contested premises of welfare theory, challenging the ethical biases
embedded in the "Pareto optimality" criterion 212 and the "voluntariness"
of voluntary exchange as the basis for determining socially optimal
outcomes. They argue that the disciplines of welfare economics and human
rights are not inherently contradictory, but instead, that the human rights
framework furnishes normative principles relevant to decision-making (for
example, that child labour is a bad thing irrespective of efficiency gains to
production). This in turn aids economists in dealing with issues of
exploitation and power relations, while the field of welfare economics
provides tools to guide specific policy choices and trade-offs. 213
Langford, on the other hand, suggests a more "nuanced" approach to
assessing the boundaries of human rights and economic claims.214 Taking
the example of social security policy, Langford questions the extent to
which the reasoning and analytical tools of welfare theory may be relied
upon to determine policy choices between different models of child grants,
where empirical claims either way are weak or heavily contested. In these
kinds of circumstances, he argues, the meaning of human rights legal
standards may be capable of being ascertained with sufficient precision,
reliability, and, at least implicitly, legitimacy, to shape public policy and
help resolve such challenging trade-offs. 215
A further approach worthy of consideration, originating in the public
health field from the ethicist Norman Daniels, is the "accountability for
reasonableness" decision-making framework.216 This approach appears to
reflect the "reasonableness" test applied by courts in determining social
rights claims in different parts of the world, with South Africa as the
emblematic case.217 However, the author makes no such explicit
connection. Daniels' approach is premised upon certain specific attributes
of a human rights approach to health, including the mobilising power of a
human rights claim, broadening the policy arena in which health is pursued
210. See, e.g., Gauri & Brinks, supra note 34.
211. Seymour & Pincus, supra note 148.
212. Pareto optimality is the basic choice rule in economics under which a policy change is
to be preferred if it leaves at least one person better off and no one worse off than other
possibilities. Id. at 391.
213. Id. at 403-04.
214. Malcolm Langford, Social Security and Children: Testing the Boundaries ofHuman Rights
and Economics, in FREEDOM FROM POVERTY AS A HUMAN RIGHT 193-218 (Bird A. Andreasson,
Stephen Marks & Arjun K. Sengupta eds., 2009).
215. Id. at 212-13.
216. NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY (2008). There is a
long history of "reasonableness" in political philosophy dating back to W.M. Sibley, The
Rational Versus the Reasonable, 62(4) PHIL. REV. 554-60 (1953).
217. Sandra Leibenberg, Adjudicating Social Rights Under a Transformative Constitution, in
Langford ed., supra note 34, at 75-101.
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(to include underlying and social determinants of health, such as
environmental, cultural, political and social factors), and a focus on
accountability, monitoring, and good governance. 218 However Daniels
eschews the relevance of any unifying philosophical justification for human
rights in the context of resolving problems of conflict and prioritisation in
decision-making. He argues that such a theory is elusive and overly
general. 219 For this reason, the human right to health (as recognised in
international law) does not feature to any appreciable extent in Daniels'
analysis.
Instead, more modestly, Daniels focuses upon the requirements for fair
deliberative processes that meet four minimum conditions: (1) the
"publicity condition," which calls for public access to the rationales for
priority-setting decisions, and public justification; (2) the "relevance
requirement," assuring that stakeholders agree on what kinds of reasons
are relevant to setting priorities, which involves adequate participatory
processes, evidence-gathering and vetting of reasons and arguments by all
those affected by a decision; (3) the "revision and appeals" condition,
guaranteeing mechanisms for challenges and dispute, and opportunities to
revise policies in line with new arguments; and (4) the "regulative
condition," which calls for public regulation of the process to ensure that
the preceding three conditions are met.220 While the conditions outlined
above are already entrenched in many expressions of a human rights
approach to public health, as well as emerging principles of international
public administrative law, 221 Daniels suggests that they are not sufficiently
integrated into priority setting. The advantage of the "accountability for
reasonableness" process is the fact that it makes explicit reasonable moral
disagreements among people on policy choices affecting health, and it is
said to offer a superior claim to legitimacy in resolving disagreements.222
However there are weaknesses in Daniels' approach as well. The first
problem is more a question of what is left out of Daniels' approach, rather
than what it includes. Daniels' procedural model lays claim to superior
legitimacy, however the premises and preconditions through which
credible and inclusive processes may lead to fair limit-setting decisions in
health care (an important objective of accountability for reasonableness) are
not explained. As Yamin has warned, the same conditions that have been
shown to cause market failure in the health sector, such as moral hazard,
asymmetrical information between health providers and patients, and
218. Daniels, supra note 216, at 313.
219. Id. at 315.
220. Id. at 328-29; Norman Daniels & Sofia Gruskin, Justice and Human Rights: Priority
Setting and Fair Deliberative Process, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1573, 1576 (2008).
221. In their founding paper for their Global Administrative Law Research project at New
York University, Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart argue that accountability can be promoted by
ensuring that administrative bodies meet adequate standards of procedural participation and
transparency, reasoned decisions, legality in accordance with substantive standards, and by
providing effective review of their decisions, drawing to various degrees on principles of
international human rights law. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 125, at 37-42.
222. Daniels, supra note 216, at 329.
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decisions under conditions of scientific uncertainty, will also likely cause
partial democratic failure when the debate is situated within the wider
public.2 3 Preconditions for active, free and meaningful participation
include, at a minimum, guarantees of free expression and association. The
habit of individuals suffering discrimination to internalise their condition
and revise their expectations downwards (Gauri's "adaptive
preferences" 224), are a more fundamental cause of market failure. A human
rights framework of analysis may help expose structural causes of
exclusion, build individuals' "capacities to aspire,"a and help to level the
playing field for a conversation more likely to generate outcomes that are
genuinely fair from the perspective of the most marginalised members of
society.226
The second, closely related problem concerns Daniels' justification for
marginalising the human right to health as recognised in international law
on the grounds that we lack a global consensus on the philosophical
justifications for the right to health. There undoubtedly is no global
consensus on a completely theorised right to health, and in a pluralistic
moral universe it's hard to see how there could be. Daniels' premise
therefore seems to offer a dubious basis for subordinating the right to
health as recognised in international law. This is particularly so in light of
alternative theories plausibly advanced by Sunstein, Tobin and others on
the legitimacy and comparative practical importance of "incompletely
theorised agreements" and by implication the quixotic character of the
quest for moral absolutes.227 The latter theories are not new. Engaging with
them would have strengthened the conceptual foundations of Daniels'
framework.
The third problem, flowing from the above, is that Daniels' account
offers no clear path to incorporating judicial reasoning and substantive law
from national courts and regional and global human rights monitoring
bodies. 228 These obligations go well beyond process duties privileged in
223. Yamin, supra note 188, at 356.
224. Gauri, supra note 206, at 79-80.
225. The term "capacity to aspire," attributed to anthropologist Arjun Appadurai, refers to
equality of agency of individuals (rather than equality of opportunity alone) in relational
rather than atomistic terms and in social and cultural context. See Arjun Appadurai, The
Capacity to Aspire: Culture and the Terms of Recognition, in CULTURE AND PUBLIC ACTION, 59-84
(Vijayendra Rao & Michael Walton eds., Stanford University Press, 2004).
226. See A. Rid, Justice and Procedure: How Does "Accountability for Reasonableness" Result in
Fair Limit-Setting Decisions? 35 J. MED. ETHICS 12 (2008) (critiquing the disconnect between
procedure and fair limit-setting outcomes in the context of Daniels' "accountability for
reasonableness" model).
227. Cass Sunstein, Incompletely Theorised Agreements, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1733, 1748 (1995).
Analysing the philosophical literature, John Tobin argues for a "social interest theory" of
human rights (or more particularly, the right to health), building upon "interest theories" of
Joseph Raz, Amartya Sen and Charles Beitz, but recognising the contested and historically
contingent nature of interests advanced in support of human rights claims, and relying upon
the process of deliberation as the principal source of moral justification. See Tobin, supra note
137, at ch. 2.
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Daniels' conceptual approach, to include substantive obligations relating to
the accessibility, quality, affordability and cultural appropriateness of
services and suchlike. States also have obligations to "take steps" to
implement social rights within the maximum extent to available resources,
to avoid and rectify discrimination, to prioritise essential minimum service
levels, and to oblige organs of the state to justify - on the basis of objective
evidence-any retrogressions and limitations on rights.229 Substantive
standards are also explicitly part of the framework for transparent
participation, public justification and remedies under emerging principles
of global administrative law.230
There is no reason why human rights law and jurisprudence should be
exempt from the requirement of deliberative discussion. To the contrary,
the role of the judiciary and the legalisation of rights claims are vital
matters of debate in any society, whatever its democratic credentials. The
jurisprudence of international human rights monitoring bodies, while
achieving increased impacts in the adjudication of claims in national courts,
has attracted considerable critical debate.231 But the fact that the state has
voluntarily assumed obligations in relation to the subject matter of rights
under treaty law surely warrants that those obligations are given due
prominence in framing and informing public debate. The fact that human
rights, including numerous social rights, are now reflected in the great
majority of constitutions reinforces this view.232
Substantive human rights obligations are contemplated, at least
implicitly, among the many inputs to participatory deliberative processes
under the "relevance" condition (principle three of Daniels' framework),
and indeed, Daniels and Gruskin do venture exactly this kind of synthesis
between "accountability for reasonableness" and human rights-based
approaches. 233 But in terms of the "accountability for reasonableness"
framework per se, strong justification is surely warranted for overlooking
the specific and legally binding articulations of the normative content and
obligations relating to human rights of different kinds, which emerge with
surprising consistency across jurisdictions, regions and legal systems. 234
The desired justification certainly does not emerge from the accountability
229. For additional analysis of these kinds of obligations in the context of public
policymaking in the health field, see Tobin, supra note 137, at ch. 5.
230. Kingsbury et al., supra note 125, at 37-42, noting substantive requirements for
administrative decision-making such as proportionality and the requirement of a remedy,
drawn from human rights jurisprudence.
231. A good example is the current debate concerning the jurisprudence of the Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the "minimum core" concept. See Tobin, supra note
137; Katharine Young, The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of
Content, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 113 (2008).
232. For a comprehensive survey of the constitutionalisation of economic and social rights
in Africa, Latin America, Asia and Eastern and Central Europe, see database of the Toronto
Initiative on Economic and Social Rights (TIESR), available at http://www.tiesr.org/data.html.
233. Daniels & Gruskin, supra note 220, at 1576.
234. Langford, From Practice to Theory, supra note 189, at 43-44 (noting certain key
commonalities in approach, as well as divergences, in a review of over two thousand judicial
and quasi-judicial decisions from twenty-nine national and international jurisdictions).
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for reasonableness framework as originally posited.
3. Conclusions on the contributions of human rights to policymaking
The discussion in this Section sought to address problems inherent in
the "value-added" challenge to human rights in development
policymaking. This Section exposed and refuted some of the more
objectionable ideological premises and methodological pitfalls of the
neoclassical economic and libertarian critiques of rights. It also sought to
analyse the pathways through which human rights may influence service
delivery and policymaking in practice, and to critically review some of the
more promising theoretical reconciliations of economics and human rights.
The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing analysis
is that there is no simple formula governing the integration of human rights
within development policymaking and service delivery. The purpose of the
present discussion is not to reconcile the various conceptual models
surveyed, but rather to probe their premises, nuances and interstices, and to
illustrate the superficial and reductive nature of the "value added" question
as a banner for purely consequentialist reasoning and instrumentalist
approaches. The privileging of one form of reasoning over another is as
artificial as it is myopic: as Seymour and Pincus observe, "when confronted
with real life choices, we intuitively seek to reconcile [deontological and
consequentialist] perspectives."2 5 To do otherwise is sheer methodological
zealotry.
Taking into account the conceptual approaches previously discussed,
along with comparative jurisprudential trends, human rights contribute to
policymaking by ensuring informed, free and meaningful participation,
providing forums for dialogue, enriching democratic deliberation, re-
"valuing" policy discussions and unsettling the myth of technocratic
expertise. Human rights are fundamentally about power: the human rights
normative framework provides principles, vocabularies and tools for
contestation, helping to destabilise prevailing power relations, reshape the
field of political possibilities, repoliticise development, and open up space
for social change.2 6 Human rights are also about responsibility: beyond the
atomistic paradigm of individual responsibility in neoclassical economic
models, the human rights framework helps to delineate and strengthen
responsibilities of governments, institutions and other relevant actors to
regulate the affairs of the state in a manner compatible with agreed
fundamental values. Finally, human rights are about accountability: human
235. Seymour & Pincus, supra note 148, at 398.
236. Brinks and Gauri characterise the judicial role in social rights adjudication--which
informs but does not constitute the framework of the present inquiry - as dialogical and
"iterative experimentation" (rather than a "command and control" caricature). This echoes
Sabel and Simon's analysis of experience from U.S.-based public interest litigation wherein
litigation "upsets the status quo, creating the context for a joint search for new solutions to
ongoing problems." Sabel & Simon, supra note 186, at 323. See Charles Sabel & William Simon,
Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1015, 1101 (2004).
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rights strengthen the culture of public justification for policy choices based
upon transparent and objective criteria,237 requiring accessible and effective
mechanisms of redress when rights are violated.
The concept of human rights rarely operates as a "trump card,"
automatically taking precedence over other social goals, and neither does it
proffer a blueprint for policymaking. The human rights framework itself
doesn't resolve difficult trade-offs and questions about prioritisation of
limited resources, but it does offer a value framework that complements
and in some respects challenges the dominant assumptions of neo-classical
economics. The human rights framework helps to: (1) correct political
market failures, (2) call into question the justice of original distributions of
power and resources underpinning the Pareto rule, (3) interrogate the
"revealed preferences" of the putatively self-interested rational individual,
and (4) resolve principal-agent problems23 8 and asymmetries in access to
information. Human rights argumentation may also help to re-frame and
re-value technocratic cost-benefit calculations, expose ideological biases in
policymaking,23 9 and challenge decisionmakers to justify simplistic inter-
temporal or horizontal trade-offs and assumptions about short-term pain
for longer-term gain.
The analytical frameworks and approaches surveyed above lay down
important markers for continuing interdisciplinary dialogue on the
comparative contributions of human rights, economics and other social
sciences in policymaking, augmented and enriched by a burgeoning body
of comparative social rights impact studies. A continuing commitment to
dialogue and interdisciplinary collaboration, particularly at the sectoral
level where specific policy and operational implications of human rights
can more effectively be worked through, will be indispensible for a more
productive synthesis between human rights and the MDGs in a post-2015
development agenda.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE POST-2015 DEVELOPMENT AGENDA AND
GLOBAL MONITORING FRAMEWORK
The September 2010 MDGs Summit produced a general understanding
of the direction of international development cooperation going forward,
rather than a clear vision statement or a roadmap of the future of
international development. The large number of commitments obscures the
fact that many of the promises and aid pledges are not new, and do little to
237. Langford, supra note 189, at 43.
238. Principal-agent theory in political science and economics deals with problems of
moral hazard (wherein a party insulated from risk behaves differently from how it would
behave if it were fully exposed to the risk), as well as conflict of interest and inadequate or
asymmetrical access to information in agency relationships - problems which are inherent in
situations of delegated legislative authority to executive agencies.
239. See, e.g., Yamin, Parra-Vera & Gianella, supra note 162, at 107, 110; Yamin, supra note
188, at 340-42 (discussing the track record and future potential of courts to act as bulwarks
against ideologically-driven liberalisation, commodification and privatisation policy agendas).
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cure the accountability shortcomings in MDG 8. But the extensive catalogue
of human rights commitments is nonetheless noteworthy;
intergovernmental negotiations on development issues are often highly
politicized, and consensus can be hard to achieve. The human rights
consensus in certain areas - including women's rights and gender,
reproductive rights, right to food, health, and promoting universal access to
basic services - is significant. This consensus offers a potentially useful
advocacy platform for integrating human rights within national MDG
strategies, tailoring the MDGs to national conditions, and summoning
political will and resources to collect disaggregated data and strengthen
national statistical systems.
The Summit Outcome was to some extent the product of its own
circumstances, yielding uncertain implications for future inter-
governmental negotiations on development issues. Nevertheless, the
challenge now is to grasp the Summit Outcome and make use of it in
creative ways, mobilising to ensure that the human rights consensus is
actually implemented in practice, and is not undermined or forgotten in the
negotiation of successor agreements. Building upon the Summit Outcome
and its aftermath, this Section of the article identifies a number of human
rights priorities for the post-2015 development agenda. The discussion
begins with a number of general parameters regarding the need to align
and tailor global goals and targets to human rights standards, calibrate an
appropriate level of ambition, and strengthen accountability mechanisms
and participatory processes. It then considers in more detail the substantive
and statistical criteria that should guide prioritisation in the post-2015
agenda. It also discusses possible new goals and targets to be included
within a successor global monitoring framework, parameters for indicator
development, and finally, proposals for addressing discrimination and
promoting substantive equality.
A. Strengthening Accountability and Participation
An explicit human rights focus can buttress arguments for tailoring and
customising the MDGs, and successor "global" targets to the particularities
and original conditions of developing countries, in line with obligations in
the ICESCR and other relevant instruments. Future determinations of the
feasibility of development targets should not assume the reasonableness of
past development trajectories, or too readily assume that progress should
be linear. Rather, such assessments should be informed by country-specific
political economy analyses and quantitative assessments of the measure of
progress that is objectively reasonable under particular circumstances. 240
Tools to guide this kind of analysis are already in use, including by certain
human rights monitoring bodies. However, generating demand for more
widespread use remains a key challenge; for example, in a review of
240. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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twenty-two Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)241 in 2008,
including countries in which national MDG costing exercises were carried
out with the U.N.'s support, none of the PRSPs referred to these cost
estimates. 242 The increased mobilisation of human rights constituencies,
communities and social movements around the subject matter of the
MDGs, demanding these as a matter of right, may help to generate both the
political will and resources for action.
The human rights framework may also strengthen arguments for
participatory decision-making processes, equitable outcomes, and
accessible and effective accountability mechanisms at all levels, including
administrative and judicial mechanisms, as discussed in Section III.C.243
Aligning and tailoring global MDG targets to duly ratified international
human rights treaty obligations, as outlined above, is an essential step
towards strengthened accountability for human development outcomes.
Contextually relevant targets, established through participatory processes,
should be embedded in national plans of action and legal and budgetary
frameworks, with clearly defined institutional responsibilities, benchmarks,
indicators, and mechanisms for monitoring and redress. 244 Participation is
not only a right, but can help cure some of the "ownership" deficiencies in
the MDGs.245 While national and local redress mechanisms will usually
(but not always) be most proximate and practically useful, states should
more systematically reflect progress towards the MDGs in their national
reports to the international human rights treaty bodies and Universal
Periodic Review process of the United Nations Human Rights Council.
States which have not yet done so should adhere to the Optional Protocol to
the ICESCR in order to permit individual complaints. 246
241. PRSPs are medium-term poverty reduction national plans that the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund require to be in place as prerequisites for concessional loans and
financial assistance.
242. Richard Manning, Using Indicators to Encourage Development: Lessons from the
Millennium Development Goals, Report for Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS
Report No. 2009:01 at 37.
243. See discussion supra Section III.C.
244. See U.N./OHCHR, supra notes 20, 45. See also Alicia Yamin, Towards Transformative
Accountability: Applying a Rights-based Approach to Fulfil Maternal Health Obligations, 12 SUR:
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2010); Lynn Freedman, Human Rights,
Constructive Accountability and Maternal Mortality in the Dominican Republic: A Commentary, 82
INT'L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 111 (2003) (proposing a framework for transformative
accountability in the context of maternal health (MDG 5), addressing human rights obligations
at global, national and local levels, and including national planning and budgetary processes
as well as judicial and informal accountability mechanisms, as well as "constructive
accountability" mechanisms at facility level).
245. Lancet & London International Development Centre Commission, supra note 15, at 11-
14.
246. For recommendations to this effect, see U.N. Doc. A/65/254, supra note 53, and for a
more detailed set of recommendations addressed to human rights treaty bodies, see Alston,
supra note 17, at 821-27. See also Margaux J. Hall, Using International Law to Promote Millennium
Health Targets, 28 Wis. INT'L L.J. 74 (2010) (discussing the potential utility of the complaints
procedure under the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW Convention). Significantly, on August
10, 2011 the CEDAW committee handed down the first decision of any treaty body in relation
to a maternal mortality communication. The Committee found that the (deceased) applicant
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Within and beyond the U.N. system, the thinking regarding post-2015
global arrangements is already well underway. In 2012 the United Nations
Secretary General appointed a Task Team to carry out consultations and
propose a vision and road map for the post-2015 development agenda. 247 In
the spring of 2012, a High Level Panel of Eminent Persons will be
appointed by the Secretary General to advise on practical measures to
overcome global development challenges, taking into account the U.N.
Task Team's report. 248 The report of the High Level Panel of Eminent
Persons will inform inter-governmental deliberations on the post-2015
development agenda, including a "special event" on the MDGs in 2013.249
Drawing from the lessons of the Millennium Declaration and 2010 MDGs
Summit, in which space for civil society participation was minimal, it will
be critical for a post-2015 agreement to be more inclusive, led by
representatives from the Global South rather than Northern donors. While
civil society uptake and ownership of the MDGs in the Global South has
been uneven at best, recent surveys indicate a clear grassroots demand for a
post-2015 development framework. 250 The quality of the consultation
process will be a key determinant of the legitimacy and ultimate impacts of
the post-2015 global monitoring framework.
B. Prioritisation and Triage- Criteria for Determining the Scope of the
Post-2015 Agenda
As vital as inclusive processes are, however, the post-2015 consultation
process must be carefully managed in order to avoid inflaming tensions
between those urging greater inclusion in future global development goals
and those arguing that less is more - i.e., that a narrow focus on a small set
of measurable global targets is indispensible for the purposes of statistical
rigour, comparability, and political mobilisation. 251 Human rights critiques
of the MDGs often argue for the inclusion of additional goals, targets and
indicators into the global list. This has resulted in the expansion of the
MDGs in 2007 to encompass decent work and sexual and reproductive
health (the latter having originally been excluded in 2000 by a strong
had suffered discrimination in accessing maternal health services on the grounds of her sex
and ethnic origin, and recommended that the government of Brazil (the respondent) provide
reparations to the victim's family and implement a range of other legal and policy measures.
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/49/D/17/2008, Aug. 10, 2011 (Restricted).
247. See United Nations Economic and Social Council, Millennium Development Goals
and the Post-2015 Development Agenda, available at http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/
about/mdg.shtml.
248. Id.
249. Summit Outcome, supra note 69, T 79.
250. Amy Pollard, Andy Sumner, Monica Polato-L6pez & Agnhs de Mauroy, 100 Voices:
Southern perspectives on what should come after the Millennium Development Goals (March 2011) at
2, available at http://www.cafod.org.uk/resources/policy/aid-and-governance/100voices. On
the relatively weak uptake of the MDGs by civil society to date see Nelson, supra note 20;
ELLEN DORSEY & PAUL NELSON, NEW RIGHTS ADVOCACY: CHANGING STRATEGIES OF
DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS NGOS (2008).
251. See Vandemoortele, supra note 26.
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political and faith-based coalition), as well as calls for goals and targets on
such matters as economic growth, governance, climate change, secondary
education, infrastructure and even electricity. 252 But a "badly decorated
Christmas tree" laden with goals would serve no useful purpose.25 3 Strong
leadership, clear communication and effective management of expectations
throughout the consultations process are therefore crucial.
In preparing for the discussions ahead, many human rights proponents
will be forced to do something that they do not like doing: prioritise. The
same applies to all other stakeholders. A clear vision of development could
help define the boundaries and parameters for the prioritisation exercise.
The 2010 MDGs Summit experience shows how challenging the quest for a
succinct and coherent negotiated vision statement can be. Nevertheless, a
clear concept and definition would help structure the various consultation
exercises underway, promote coherence, and identify synergies within a
manageable list of post-2015 goals and targets.25 4 With or without a clear
conceptual chapeau, agreement will be needed on the specific purposes and
audiences for a post-2015 global monitoring framework. A critical
distinction must be made at the outset between the parameters and
requirements for monitoring at the global level, as opposed to at the
national and sub-national levels. There needs to be a clear agreement that
any global monitoring framework requires explicit tailoring to national
conditions and resource constraints, in line with international human rights
treaty standards. The failure to be clear about the MDGs' purposes was
certainly among its most regrettable shortcomings from the outset.
Subject to this threshold question of objectives, discussion will then be
needed on the relative importance, as well as limitations and possible
drawbacks, of quantitative measurement, and how qualitative criteria and
methods may play a more active role. Both are surely needed for a
potentially wide range of purposes,255 including vetting the issues for
252. See Vandemoortele & Delamonica, supra note 15, at 63; Daniel Kaufmann, Casting
Light on the MDGs through better Governance and Less Corruption, THE KAUFMANN GOVERNANCE
POST (Sept. 28, 2010), http://thekaufmannpost.net/casting-light-on-the-mdgs-through-better-
governance-and-less-corruption/.
253. Jan Vandemoortele, The MDG Story: Intention Denied, DEVELOPMENT & CHANGE 1-21,
11 (2011).
254. It has been argued that the lack of a coherent vision of development in the process
leading to the MDGs "generate[d] a poorly aligned means, ends and sometimes competing
ideas about normative aspiration (e.g. economic growth vs. sustainability), which has made
the MDG project less useful than it could have been, since opportunities to link the goals
together coherently have been missed and a rigorous approach to assessment has been
overlooked." Lancet & London International Development Centre Commission, supra note 15,
at 1008. Drawing from Amartya Sen's theories, it has been suggested that a guiding conception
of development as "a dynamic process involving sustainable and equitable access to improved
well-being" could provide a rational and principled structure for post-2015 development
goals, based upon five guiding principles: holism, equity, sustainability, ownership and global
obligation."Id. at 1008-11.
255. Kanbur, supra note 195 at 1. As Ravi Kanbur explains: "Numerical information can be
more easily aggregated, but it can miss out on nuance and texture. General coverage aids
representativeness, but can lose context. Statistical inference can help in discussion of
causality, but misses out on the power of inductive approaches.. . . The key, then, is how to
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inclusion in the post-2015 global monitoring framework. Statistical rigour
should be encouraged for the sake of objective monitoring and evidence-
based policymaking.256 The desire for quantifiable expressions of human
progress can be viewed as an attempt "to create a basis for mutual
accommodation in a context of suspicion and disagreement," thereby
promoting procedural regularity and enhancing public perceptions of
fairness.257 However, the ideal of objectivity should not too readily be
assumed.258
When weighing the candidates for inclusion in a post-2015 global list,
consideration must also be given to the "crowding-out" problem, meaning
the potential of the MDGs to inadvertently overshadow other important
issues that have not made it onto the global list. Prioritisation should be
guided by substantive human rights criteria from a normative or
deontological standpoint, as well as empirical evidence of where the major
bottlenecks most commonly are for any given right (or corresponding
global goal or target). Prioritisation should take into account what the most
clearly proven interventions are in local contexts, and what proxy measures
might be feasible for human rights or goals left out of the list. Hardened by
the MDGs experience, the post-2015 prioritisation exercise should also
explicitly anticipate the gaps that will likely arise in a new global list of
goals and targets, and the thematic and operational linkages that such gaps
might inadvertently foreclose.259
Agreement on a succinct set of ten goals may offer a path between the
Scylla of MDG proliferation and the Charybdis of the status quo. Consistent
with the rationale behind the existing list, any additional global goals
should be capable of expressing widely recognised ends, rather than means,
of human development. 260 Careful deliberation will be needed to select the
appropriate baseline year for any new set of targets and the period over
which they are to be achieved: an excessive time horizon lacks credibility,
but an excessively long period exerts little political pressure. Consideration
will also be needed on whether performance is to be expressed in relative or
make the best of complementarities while minimizing tradeoffs."
256. For arguments highlighting the importance of statistical rigour in the context of the
health-related MDGs, see Amir Attaran, An Immeasurable Crisis? A Criticism of the Millennium
Development Goals and Wh/by They Cannot be Measured, 2 PLOS MEDICINE 955 (2005), available at
http://www.plosmedicine.org.
257. THEODORE PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE AND
PUBLIC LIFE 149, 187, 223 (1995).
258. As Porter points out, quantitative analysis is often subject to "pressures to reify its
terms, to deny the validity of human judgement, to lust after the impersonality of purely
mechanical objectivity." Id. at 187. See also Dutta, supra note 156, at 415-16.
259. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
260. "An ideal set of global targets is one that expresses the many dimensions of human
well-being yet includes a limited number of targets; that addresses the complexity of
development yet exploit the charm of simplicity; that embodies agreed principles yet allows
for quantitative monitoring; that reflects global priorities and universal standards yet is
tailored to the domestic situation and local challenges; and that specifies the destination yet
spells out the journey for getting there." Vandemoortele, supra note 14, at 9-10.
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absolute benchmarks, 261 mindful of the controversies relating to Target L.A
discussed in subsections II.B.2 and II.B.3. Interim targets should be included
for the sake of political accountability, 262 with longer-term targets aiming
for universal access. 263
The requirement that post-2015 goals should focus on ends rather than
means would appropriately exclude putative targets for economic growth,
infrastructure, electricity and the like, however important the latter may be
from an instrumental standpoint. A modest rationalisation of existing
health-related goals should help to accommodate a small number of
additional priority concerns, although the unacceptable scale of avoidable
maternal deaths surely demands that maternal health be given due
prominence in the post-2015 list. The integration of donor states'
commitments as far as possible within the revised list might also expand
the space for additional priority issues, rather than quarantining all such
commitments within MDG 8. This would also help to reinforce the
relevance of the MDGs and the reality of poverty in all countries,
irrespective of their relative per capita GDP, while recognising the rising
proportion of income-poor individuals living in middle-income countries.
An integrated structure of this kind may also more effectively communicate
the need for a genuine global partnership and policy coherence in order to
achieve specific human development outcomes. 264
C. Candidate Goals and Targets
A post-2015 global monitoring framework should include a goal,
target(s) and indicators capturing essential civil and political rights
prerequisites for public participation and effective and equitable service
delivery. The inclusion of civil and political rights guarantees can be
justified on both normative and instrumental grounds, building upon the
modest concessions on these issues by Member States at the 2010 MDGs
Summit.265 Certain countries have added "governance" goals to their
261. Vandemoortele & Delamonica, supra note 15, at 63.
262. Vandemoortele, supra note 14, at 20.
263. See U.N. Doc. A/65/254, supra note 53, 1f 12-17 (arguing for the importance of
setting targets for universal access in the context of the rights to water and sanitation). Others
commentators have ventured more far-reaching arguments for the concept of universalism in
the context of social policy, challenging the approach of targeting in the MDGs and aiming for
a re-politicisation of the development agenda. See, e.g., Andrew M. Fischer, Towards Genuine
Universalism within Contemporary Development Policy, 41 IDS BULLETIN 36 (2010); Thandika
Mkandawire, Targeting and Universalism in Poverty Reduction, U.N. Research Inst. For Social
Development, Social Policy and Development Programme Paper No. 23 (2005).
264. For arguments along these lines, see Caliari & Darrow, supra note 61. Target 8.E ("In
cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable essential drugs in
developing countries," supra note 7) is the most obvious target for rationalisation and
integration within a revised global health goal, however there may be further potential for
rationalisation, for example in relation to indicators dealing with sectoral targeting of ODA.
265. It has sometimes been suggested, too categorically, that "democratic accountability,
human rights and the rule of law" are indispensible for achieving quantitative targets such as
those expressed in the MDGs, and that therefore, at least implicitly, the MDGs can be taken as
a proxy measurement for the former (qualitative) concerns. See Myles A. Wickstead, Holding on
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nationally customised MDGs. However this practice warrants critical
review from methodological and ideological perspectives, given the
inherent elasticity of "governance" concepts and the dubious motives that
governance agendas may conceal, as well as more explicit human rights
conflicts. 266 Recent work on human rights indicators offers considerable
material and inspiration from which to draw for global monitoring
purposes, particularly when it comes to tailoring globally-agreed indicators
to the national and sub-national levels. 267 There is a veritable industry in
voice and accountability measurement as well. 268 Grassroots aspirations for
civil and political rights are being voiced as loudly now as ever, and would
presumably come through strongly in any genuinely participatory post-
2015 consultations process. A self-standing goal on civil and political rights
would best highlight the intrinsic importance of these rights; however, a
plausible alternative might be to group these rights within a self-standing
"enabling environment" goal, which may also include global partnership
commitments relating to aid, trade, debt relief and investment, to the extent
to the MDGs (For Now), 41 IDS BULL. 123, 124-25 (2010). The recent uprisings in star MDG
performers in the Arab region have strongly rebutted this assumption, reaffirming the intrinsic
importance of all human rights - civil, social, cultural, economic and political, whatever their
instrumental relationships. However, for an indication of some of the conceptual and
methodological challenges relating to standardised global human rights indicators, see Kate
Raworth, Measuring Human Rights, 15 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 111, 113-15, 128-31 (2001); Nancy
Thede, Human Rights and Statistics: Some Reflections on the No-Man's Land Between Concept and
Indicator, 18 STAT. J. U. N. ECON. COMM. FOR EUR. 259, 265-69 (2001) (referring variously to
problems of conceptualisation, contextualisation, relativity, interpretation, subjectivity,
feasibility, and data limitations). A composite "Human Rights Accountability Index" offers
one potentially practical means of overcoming such limitations, bringing together indicators
relating to States' formal adherence to human rights treaties, respect for procedural
obligations, and responsiveness to outcomes of human rights monitoring procedures. See
Philip Alston, Promoting the Accountability of Members of the New U.N. Human Rights Council, 15
J. TRANSNT'L L. & POL'Y 49-94,87-93 (2006).
266. Mongolia's "zero-tolerance" anti-corruption target was discussed, supra note 68. By
way of other examples, the government of Turkmenistan included a target on combating
terrorism as part of its national goal on developing global partnerships, and Afghanistan
added a goal on security with a target to increase military expenditure as a proportion of GDP
and overall public expenditure. See MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT:
TURKMENISTAN (2003), available at http://www.undg.org/archive-docs/4509-
TurkmenistanMDGReport -. English.doc at 59-61; ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN,
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT (2010), available at
http://www.undg.org/docs/11924/MDG-2010-Report-Final-Draft-25Nov2010.pdf at 43. For
a wider-ranging critique of the governance agenda in development see James Thuo Gathii,
Good Governance as a Counter Insurgency Agenda to Oppositional and Transformative Social Projects
in International Law, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 107 (1999).
267. U.N./OHCHR, Report on Indicators for Promoting and Monitoring the Implementation of
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. HRI/MC/2008/3 (June 6, 2008), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indicators/docs/HRI.MC.2008.3_en.pdf; Report ofthe
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/2011/90 (Apr. 26, 2011),
availableathttp://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/indicators/docs/E-2011-90_en.pdf.
268. See, e.g., GOVERNANCE AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT RESOURCE CENTRE, HELPDESK
RESEARCH REPORT: VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY INDEXES, Mar. 3, 2009, available at
http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/HD575.pdf; Measuring Work on Voice and
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that the latter are not integrated within health-related or other MDGs. 269
Social security, or social protection, is another obvious candidate for
inclusion in an updated list of global human development priorities, given
recent normative advancements concerning the right to social security 270
and the importance of securing a social protection floor in the midst of
global economic, environmental, and social crises. Safeguarding the right to
work is also vital in times of crisis, and a number of countries have
included employment-related goals in their national plans.2n Youth
unemployment has ignited or intensified anti-authoritarian and anti-
globalisation movements worldwide. Normative advances concerning the
right to work strengthen the case for its inclusion in a post-2015
agreement, 272 although some commentators have questioned how far
"decent work" objectives could usefully be advanced through a post-2015
global agreement as distinct from national policies.273
There are also strong arguments to include water and sanitation as a
self-standing goal, given the recent recognition by the General Assembly
and Human Rights Council of the human rights to water and sanitation, the
comparative lack of progress in realising these rights, and the powerful
evidence of their fundamental importance for the achievement of other
human development goals.274 The human rights traction in these sectors is
now strong. In 2011 the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for
Water and Sanitation (JMP)275 and a number of influential multilateral and
bilateral donor organisations launched a work programme to help define
the post-2015 monitoring framework in the water and sanitation sectors. In
May 2011 the above organisations committed to integrate the rights to
water and sanitation into the global monitoring framework for the water
269. See Centre for International Governance Innovation, Toward a Post-2015 Development
Paradigm (II), June 20-24, 2011, Bellagio, Italy (proposing an enabling environment goal as one
of twelve new post-2015 development goals).
270. See CESCR, General Comment 19, supra note 87; Langford supra note 214. See also U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/11/9 (Mar. 17, 2009), 1 15; U.N. Doc. A/65/259 (Aug. 9, 2010), 110, supra note
87.
271. Examples include Argentina, which created a stand-alone goal "promoting decent
employment" following its economic crisis in 2001. See Reptiblica Argentina, Objetivos de
Desarollo del Milenio (2010), available at http://www.undg.org/docs/11540/Argentina-ODM-
2009.pdf at 38-49. For an analysis of Target 1.B (decent work) and its indicators from a human
rights perspective, see Gillian MacNaughton & Diane Frey, Decent Work, Human Rights, and the
Millennium Development Goals, 7 HASTINGS RACE & Pov. L.J. 303, 331-43 (2010).
272. CESCR, General Comment No. 18, The right to work, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/18, 35th
session (Feb. 6, 2006); see also MacNaughton & Frey, supra note 271 (on the I.L.O.'s "decent
work" agenda).
273. Claire Melamed & Andy Sumner, A Post-2015 Global Agreement: Why, What, Who?
Background paper for Overseas Development Institute/U.N. Development Program
workshop on a Post-2015 Development Agreement, Cairo, Oct. 26-27, 2011, available at
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/ download/ 6075.pdf at 29.
274. See U.N. Doc. A/65/254, supra note 53.
275. The WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation
(JMP) is the official United Nations mechanism tasked with monitoring progress towards the
MDG 7 targets relating to drinking water and sanitation. See WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring
Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation, available at http://www.wssinfo.org/ (last
visited Mar. 22, 2012).
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and sanitation indicators in MDG Target 7.C, exploring how qualitative
attributes of these rights-such as affordability, accessibility, continuity and
safety - may be factored into MDG monitoring. 276 This may serve as a
valuable precedent and source of inspiration for other MDGs.
Finally, no post-2015 agreement could be credible or effective without
meaningful commitments to deal with the problem of climate change.
Climate change is a quintessential tragedy of the commons, a global market
failure fuelled by the failure of national politics. Climate change has been
characterised as a "profound denier of freedom of action and a source of
disempowerment." 277 The human rights dimensions of this issue are the
subject of a burgeoning literature. 278 Indicator 7.2 for MDG target 7.A
(ensuring environmental sustainability) refers to "C02 emissions, total, per
capita and per USD1 GDP (Purchasing Power Parity, or PPP)," although
the lack of any quantified time-bound performance benchmark makes this
indicator ineffective and un-monitorable. However, addressing climate
change cannot be reduced to developing new targets and indicators.
Climate change fundamentally challenges prevailing consumption patterns,
commercial and political incentives, and ways of thinking about both
human rights and development. The human impacts and causes of climate
change are now very clear to any impartial and informed observer, and the
global tipping point towards potentially catastrophic and irreversible
harms is likely to occur well within the framework of the post-2015
agenda. 279 Inequalities within countries are a likely marker for vulnerability
to climate shocks, 280 hence any principled and effective post-2015
276. See JMP Post-2015 Consultation Report, supra note 52.
277. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/8,
FIGHTING CLIMATE CHANGE: HUMAN SOLIDARITY IN A DIVIDED WORLD 31 (2007). As the authors
of Human Development Report observe, "[o]ne section of humanity - broadly the poorest 2.6
billion-will have to respond to climate change forces over which they have no control,
manufactured through political choices in countries where they have no voice." Id.
278. On the relationships between climate change and human rights, see CLIMATE CHANGE
AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Stephen Humphreys, ed., 2009); SIOBHAN MCINERNEY-LANKFORD, MAC
DARROW & LAVANYA RAJAMANI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: A REVIEW OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DIMENSIONS 7-8, 47-53 (2011); MAC DARROW, JACKIE DUGARD, ANNE-
MARI KARLSSON & KARIN LEXtN, CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS TO WATER AND
SANITATION, (Position Paper for the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights
to Safe Drinking Water and Sanitation), 11-16, 27-31, 35-37 (2010), available at
http://www.hydrology.nl/images/docs/alg/U.N.HCR-Climate-Change-RightWaterSanit
ation.pdf.
279. For an alarming but credible assessment of the latest scientific evidence, see James E.
Hansen & Makiko Sato, Paleoclimate Implications for Human-made Climate Change, in
CLIMATE CHANGE AT THE EVE OF THE SECOND DECADE OF THE CENTURY: INFERENCES FROM
PALEOCLIMATE AND REGIONAL ASPECTS: PROCEEDINGS OF MILUTIN MILANKOVITCH 130n,
ANNIVERSARY SYMPOSIUM (A. Berger, F. Mesinger & D. Gijadi, eds., 2011). On recent
projections, in order to avoid dangerous levels of greenhouse gas emissions, the total amount
of global emissions needs to fall by 2050 by at least 50 to 85 percent from 2000 levels. This
means that heavily polluting OECD countries will need to have cut their emissions by 80 to 90
percent, and developing countries will probably need to cut their collective emissions by 30 to
60 percent, having peaked by the year 2025. Stephen Humphreys, Conceiving Justice:
Articulating Common Causes in Distinct Regimes, in Humphreys, ed., supra note 278, at 305.
280. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008, supra note 277, at 79.
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agreement will need to take into account not only national capacities and
relative responsibilities for greenhouse gas emissions, but also in-country
inequalities.281 Financial requirements for mitigation in developing
countries are estimated to reach $140-175 billion a year by 2030 with
associated financing needs of $265-565 billion, and the additional
investment and financing required for climate change adaptation purposes
may be between $30-100 billion annually. 282 Sustainable transitions to clean
energy pathways also require rapid progress on technology transfer. 283
Hence, international cooperation is essential. Unsustainable consumption
patterns in both the Global North and South, and what Henry Shue termed
"luxury emissions,"284 are clearly difficult topics of political discussion, as
the slow progress of global climate change negotiations attests.285 But the
failure of the post-2015 development agenda to grapple with these issues
would constitute a shameful missed opportunity and an abrogation of
human rights responsibilities.
D. Indicators for the Post-2015 Global Monitoring Framework
The OECD-hosted Global Project on Measuring the Progress of
Societies concluded its 2008 report with four lessons for indicator
development: (1) be clear about one's objectives and how one expects to
achieve them; (2) be realistic about what an indicator set can achieve; (3)
never underestimate the importance of the process of designing and
agreeing the indicators; and (4) think long-term: be persistent and
flexible.286 Indicators in general terms should be valid, relevant and
effective in measuring what they purport to measure. They should also be
reliable, enabling consistent application across different contexts by
different groups of people at different times. Proposed indicators at the
global level should be measurable, time-bound, cost-effective to collect,
281. Perhaps the best-known model that integrates the three vital criteria of relative
responsibility, capacity, and in-country inequalities, is the "Greenhouse Development Rights"
framework. See PAUL BAER ET AL., THE GREENHOUSE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS FRAMEWORK: THE
RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT IN A CLIMATE CONSTRAINED WORLD (Rev. 2d ed. 2008).
282. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010: DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE
CHANGE 22-23 (2009). Mitigation refers to efforts to prevent greenhouse gas emissions, and
adaptation refers to the responses to foreseeable and existing climate-related harms.
283. For a human rights analysis and recommendations concerning climate change
technology policy, see INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, BEYOND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CLIMATE-CONSTRAINED WORLD
(Versoix: ICHRP, 2011).
284. Henry Shue, Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions, 15(1) LAW & POL'Y 39-60
(1993).
285. The legislative centrepieces of the global climate change regime are the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its
Seventh Session, Addendum, UNFCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 (an. 21, 2002); Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22. On the
slow progress, see Brian Brady & Matt Chorley, Durban Conference: The forgotten planet, THE
INDEPENDENT (Dec. 4, 2011), http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-
change/ durban-conference-the-forgotten-planet-6272110.html.
286. Manning, supra note 242, at 20 n. 22.
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easy to communicate for advocacy purposes, and open to cross-country
comparisons. The process of indicator development should itself observe
accountability principles, including transparency about data sources and
methodology. 287
Data sources themselves should be cost-effective, standardised,
population-based, and comparable across countries and over time, and
contribute to strengthening national monitoring capacity. 288 All relevant
data sources should be explored - events-based data relating to observable
human rights violations, standards-based data expressed in quantitative
ordinal scales, national socioeconomic and administrative statistics, and
survey-based data - within their respective limitations.289 When
considering the statistical parameters, it should be borne in mind that much
data that are presently available at country level - for example through
Demographic Health Surveys, which are increasingly income and gender-
disaggregated - are not being used. Much more data could be collected
were there the political will to do so, although for the purposes of global
monitoring there are limits to the number of additional questions that can
be added to existing household survey instruments. The lag time in the
generation of baselines and measurement tools for new indicators should
also be borne in mind in terms of any proposals to be proposed to the
Secretary General's High Level Event in 2013, and subsequently to Member
States in 2015.290
As vital a variable as statistical rigour is, however, it cannot be the sole
gatekeeper for the post-2015 development agenda, and should not
arbitrarily or categorically trump substantive policy considerations.291 "To
foreswear the use of available, though imperfect, data does not advance
scholarship," and does little to redress the worst excesses of human
behaviour. 292 Moreover, the weight that one may place on statistical
parameters might vary, to some extent, depending upon the relative
priority of global communications and advocacy purposes of the post-2015
agenda, as distinct from its monitoring or planning purposes. For example
the maternal mortality ratio (an outcome or impact indicator) is a far
weaker indicator than measures of coverage such as skilled birth
287. Nikhil K. Dutta, supra note 156; U.N./OHCHR (2011), supra note 269, T 5.
288. JMP Post-2015 Consultation Report, supra note 52, at 41.
289. Todd Landman, Measuring Human Rights: Principle Practice, and Policy 26(4) HuM. RTS.
Q. 906-31,923-24 (2004); U.N./OHCHR (2008), supra note 269, 11 13-14.
290. Developments in indicator measurement tools could typically take two to five years,
for indicators not currently captured in existing data collection systems. These must be applied
consistently in a significant number of countries, although with survey cycles taking three to
five years, initial reporting on a new baseline could take anywhere from seven to twelve years.
Capturing changes following that baseline could take an additional five years. JMP Post-2015
Consultation Report, supra note 52, at 42-43.
291. Supra notes 253-66 and accompanying text. For concerns that technical statistical
parameters have displaced the "relevance and effectiveness" criteria for the decent work
indicators in Target l.B, see MacNaughton & Frey, supra note 271, at 340-42.
292. James C. Strouse & Richard P. Claude, Empirical Comparative Rights Research: Some
Preliminary Tests of Development Hypotheses, in COMPARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTs 52 (Richard P.
Claude ed., 1976), cited in Landman, supra note 289, at 909.
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attendance and availability of emergency obstetric care (an input, effort, or
process indicator), given the well-known problems of underreporting and
misreporting of maternal deaths. 293 But under certain conditions and
caveats, the former indicator might nevertheless serve useful advocacy
objectives for a broad global audience, bringing visible attention to the
scandal of avoidable maternal deaths in a way that other measures, on their
own, cannot.
There may be deeper problems with indicators from the perspective of
public management theory. For example, in the context of the MDGs, Rosga
and Satterthwaite warn of the potential for the human rights indicators
project "to close space for democratic accountability and purport to turn an
exercise of judgement into one of technical measurement." 294 In a similar
vein, within a deeper critique of the political economy of the MDGs, Poku
and Whitman question the utility, and even the possibility, of measuring
and costing the MDGs, and argue that "[w]hat counts as 'momentum' in
the years to 2015 cannot . . . be reduced to statistical indicators." 295 The
debates on post-2015 indicators would do well to heed these critiques.
More specifically, global MDG indicators should go beyond standard
outcome" or impact measures (U5M, maternal mortality ratio, literacy
rates and so forth) to include a modest number of indicators that capture
human rights commitment as well as fiscal and policy effort and inputs
necessary to achieve desired outcomes, to the extent that these can be
generalised across countries. 296 The latter kinds of indicators promote
accountability for human development outcomes by providing the basis for
evidence-based judgments on the extent to which outcomes (positive as
well as negative) are the result of conscious policy choices, or omissions, of
human rights duty-bearers (typically, but not exclusively, authorities of the
state), or alternatively the result of accident or purely exogenous factors.
Examples of commitment indicators would include human rights treaty
ratification and constitutional protection of rights, observance of procedural
293. See UNICEF, WHO, & UNFPA GUIDELINES FOR MONITORING THE AVAILABILITY AND
USE OF OBSTETRIC SERVICES (1997) at 7-14, available at
http://www.childinfo.org/files/maternal-mortality-finalgui.pdf. There are two indicators for
Target 5.A: Indicator 5.1 is the maternal mortality ratio, and indicator 5.2 is the proportion of
births attended by skilled health personnel. As an illustration of the problem of indicator
validity and misreporting, a decline in the former ratio may in fact reflect improved
surveillance rather than declining maternal deaths. For other problems, see Attaran, supra note
256, at 957-58.
294. Ann Janette Rosga & Margaret L. Satterthwaite, The Trust in Indicators: Measuring
Human Rights, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 253, 258 (2009). In similar vein, see Sally Engle Merry,
Measuring the World, Vol. 52, Suppl. 3, CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 83 (Apr. 2011); David
Kennedy, Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance, 27 SYDNEY L. REV. 5 (2005).
295. Nana Poku & Jim Whitman, The Millennium Development Goals and Development After
2015,32 THIRD WORLDQ. 181,187 (2011).
296. On human rights indicators generally, see U.N./OHCHR 2008 and 2011, supra note
267. "It is important to note that process indicators are not poor substitutes for impact
indicators. Process indicators, in fact, provide a great deal of extremely useful information that
impact indicators do not," helping to explain variations in outcomes and highlight needed
policy interventions. See U.N. Guidelines for Monitoring the Availability and Use of Obstetric
Services, supra note 293, at 21.
118 [Vol. 15
64
Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 15 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol15/iss1/3
The Millennium Development Goals
obligations under the U.N. Human Rights Council, and responsiveness to
procedural outcomes. 297 Indicators of fiscal or policy effort might include
the percentage of the national budget dedicated to particular rights or
corresponding MDGs. The obligation to put in place a national plan for the
realisation of particular rights is a core obligation under human rights
treaties, as well as a very real necessity in practice if the goal of universal
access is to be seriously pursued, especially in notoriously fragmented
sectors such as water and sanitation. 298
Indicators relating to the outcomes of human rights claims before
national courts might seem intuitively important, although justiciability is
just the tip of the human rights accountability iceberg. However, efforts to
demonstrate the relevance and validity, in statistical terms, of such
indicators must confront the problem that redress mechanisms and
preconditions for accessing them are most often lacking in countries where
violations are most pronounced. As in the field of treaty ratification, 299
there may be significant empirical challenges in demonstrating a cause-
effect relationship between inputs and desired outcomes. In Colombia and
Brazil, as discussed in subection IV.D.1, judicialised dispensation of
curative (rather than preventive or basic) health services appears to have
distorted public spending priorities towards the middle classes.300 While
these are admittedly unusual cases, they do bear out the possibility that
judicial redress, in some conditions, may frustrate rather than further the
objectives of a good national health plan.
However, as with the post-2015 menu generally, the relevance of these
kinds of indicators cannot be determined exclusively by the evolving and
contested nature of the empirical evidence. There are inevitable limitations
on the extent to which we will be able to generalise with any confidence
(statistically and otherwise) across countries and societies on the
institutional prerequisites for effective pro-poor human rights claims.
Nevertheless, rights without remedies ring hollow in theory as well as in
practice. The programme logic of the post-2015 global monitoring
framework would be incomplete without careful analysis of the role of
human rights accountability mechanisms, including but not limited to
judicial and quasi-judicial forums, within the wider scheme of incentives
for better service delivery. Prioritising among the various possible choices
297. See Alston, supra note 265 at 61-67, 87-96. Procedural obligations could include
compliance with requests for provision of information to Special Procedures of the U.N.
Human Rights Council, issuance by countries of standing invitations to Special Procedures,
and timely submission of reports to human rights treaty bodies. Responsiveness could include
responses to recommendations flowing from treaty body, Special Procedure and Universal
Periodic Review processes.
298. These kinds of process, effort, or "input" indicators are already being collected at the
global level for the MDG water and sanitation targets, in addition to comparative data on
national policies, institutions, human resource investments, stakeholder coordination and
harmonisation, and aid flows. See World Health Organization & U.N.-Water, supra note 180 at
37-70.
299. Supra note 193 and accompanying text.
300. Supra note 186 and accompanying text.
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of "input," "commitment" and "process" indicators should be somewhat
easier than for many outcome indicators given that data for many of the
former indicators is increasingly available in global databases.301 It seems
appropriate, therefore, to highlight the identification of commitment and
policy effort (or process) indicators as a priority field for further empirical
investigation and interdisciplinary debate towards 2015.
E. Tackling Discrimination and Promoting Substantive Equality
Perhaps the biggest problem in historical terms, underlying virtually all
others, remains inequality. Most individuals and almost every culture,
religion and philosophical tradition value notions of equality for its own
sake.30 2 However, since the year 2000, inequalities have increased between
and within countries. 303 The MDGs are certainly not solely responsible for
this, but their equity-blindness arguably makes them complicit. This is first
and foremost a moral issue, and it undermines the MDGs' progress on their
own terms. Hence, the goal of substantive equality should be at the centre
of the post-2015 debate. Non-discrimination and the principle of
substantive equality must be integrated more effectively into all goals, and
the necessary investments must be made at both national and global levels
for the additional data required to be collected, in line with Member States'
commitments at the MDGs Summit.
Disaggregation by income quintiles and gender, and to some extent age
and ethnicity, already occurs through some of the major survey
instruments, such as Demographic Health Surveys and UNICEF's Multiple
Indicator Cluster Surveys, although these surveys often bypass the growing
ranks of people living in informal settlements. The latter deficiencies need
to be addressed as a matter of priority, and disaggregated data collected
more systematically. Additional grounds of discrimination should be
included in line with evidence of where social exclusion is greatest in the
sectors corresponding to the MDGs, while taking into account the
prohibited grounds of discrimination under human rights treaties. 3 This
involves a delicate balance between normative concerns and statistical
feasibility parameters, including reliability and comparability. Data
availability is another constraint, although including additional fields for
301. See Landman, supra note 289, at 926-28. Data relating to treaty ratification, periodic
reporting, and responsiveness to recommendations of international human rights mechanisms
is available at www.ohchr.org. The TIESR database, supra note 232, contains a comprehensive
set of quantitative information on the constitutional status of economic and social rights in
developing countries. The latter indicator has some empirical backing given and to the extent
that successful human rights litigation tracks explicit constitutional human rights provisions,
supra note 192. But the relevance of constitutionalisation of rights as an indicator, and other
possible indicators such as the existence of a national human rights institution, may depend
significantly upon the national context, calling into question their relevance in the post-2015
global list. See Alston, supra note 265 n. 114 and accompanying text.
302. WORLD BANK, supra note 173, at 18. See also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
304. CESCR, General Comment No. 20, supra note 40.
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data collection, linked to human rights standards, may help to create
national demand for that data.30 5 Nevertheless, weighing the opportunity
costs of household-level data collection is a serious matter. As Manning
remarks, we appear to be seeing "a growing mismatch between the
multiple demands for monitoring and the ability of local systems to
generate credible data. There is a danger that an 'MDG Results Industry'
could consume a lot of resources to rather little effect." 306
Of the many grounds of discrimination covered by the human rights
treaties, renewed efforts are needed to capture discrimination on the
grounds of ethnicity, and ideally also religious or political belief. Patterns of
exclusion along ethnic lines have been documented in many countries
where MDGs progress is - in aggregate terms - otherwise broadly on track.
As Stewart decries, a dearth of international statistics on ethnic exclusion
reflects, as well as causes, this lack of focus. 3 0 7 These are obviously thorny
issues, not helped by the limited and truncated guidance from the U.N.
system. 308 Yet Demographic and Health Surveys have included an ethnic
variable in fifty-five of the seventy-seven countries covered to date,309 and
many countries in Latin America, Asia, and Oceania (less so in Europe and
Africa) collect data on ethnicity in their national censuses.31 0 The experience
in Latin American countries where social and economic inequalities can be
extreme shows that disaggregation by ethnicity is possible even in the most
egregious situations given minimal political will, although clearly the
overall record is crying out for improvement.311 Disaggregation by regions
within a country may offer a viable proxy measure, in some circumstances.
Disaggregation by disability is another issue meriting full attention in
view of the U.N.'s recent global survey suggesting that more than a billion
individuals today experience disability with attendant impacts on health,
education achievement, economic opportunities, and poverty. 312 Disability
305. Statement of Francesca Perucci (U.N. Inter-Agency Expert Group on MDG
Indicators), Experts Group Meeting to Support the Advancement of the Post-2015 U.N.
Development Agenda, New York, Feb. 27-29, 2012 (statement given on Feb. 28 . 2012).
306. Manning, supra note 242, at 38.
307. Frances Stewart, Horizontal Inequalities as a Cause of Conflict: A Review of CRISE
Findings, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011, BACKGROUND PAPER 5 (2010).
308. See supra, notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
309. Stewart, supra note 307, at 5. However, Stewart also notes that these surveys lack
many relevant variables and are not conducted at sufficiently regular internals.
310. See United Nations Statistical Division, Ethnicity: A Review of Data Collection and
Dissemination (Aug. 2003), http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/sconcerns/
popchar/Ethnicitypaper.pdf. The number of countries collecting this data is likely higher in
2011, although the census data is generally only collected every ten years and hence not
capable of capturing and enabling policy responses to short-term variations. The author is
grateful to Nicolas Fasel for discussions on this issue.
311. Simone Cecchini & Francesco Notti, Millennium Development Goals and Human Rights:
Faraway, so Close? 12 J. HUM. DEV'T & CAPABILITIES 121, 121-33 (2011) (reporting that 10 out of
25 country reports in the Latin American region provided data on at least one MDG indicator
for indigenous people or afro descendants (typically revealing alarming disparities when this
was done), and from the year 2000 most national censuses included questions on the ethnic
self-identification of the population).
312. WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION & WORLD BANK, WORLD DISABILITY REPORT 191-92
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disproportionately affects those already poor or otherwise vulnerable, and
discrimination is among the drivers of the exclusion of persons with
disabilities from economic and social life. Much more is now known about
the kinds of legal and policy measures, services, and investments necessary
to realise the human rights of persons with disabilities. However, lack of
rigorous and comparable data on disability and evidence on programmes
that work do, to varying degrees, continue to impede understanding and
action.3 13 The post-2015 development negotiations offer a timely
opportunity to redress these imbalances and injustices, building on the
normative framework of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities, including its specific commitments relating to development
cooperation.3 14
Self-evidently, inequalities in society cannot be adequately addressed
on a piecemeal, indicator-by-indicator basis.3s 5 The values of equity and
equality need to be hard-wired into the DNA of the post-2015 agreement.
Nevertheless, there is a range of ways in which the technical design and
adaptation of global goals and targets could better address discrimination
issues and promote the goal of substantive equality. Fukuda-Parr, for
example, has argued for the introduction of an additional global goal on
reducing inequality within and between countries.316 Certain countries
have adopted this approach; for example, Romania's national MDG report
includes an additional target to reduce illiteracy among the Roma, and the
government of Vietnam has added targets to its health and education goals
in order to close the inequality gap between minorities and other groups.317
Weighting quintile-specific values in a way that rewards progress in the
lower income quintiles 318 and disaggregating by regions or sub-national
units are among the other options to be considered. Thailand's MDG-plus
framework, for example, adds specific targets for disadvantaged regions in
(2011).
313. Id.
314. Final Rep. of the Ad Hoc Comm. on a Comprehensive and Integral Int'l Convention
on the Prot. and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, 61st Sess.,
Dec. 6, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/61/611 (2006). Article 32 of the Convention calls for making general
development activities more disability-inclusive, with emphasis on capacity-building,
cooperation in research and technology transfer, and economic assistance as appropriate.
315. Manning, supra note 242, at 22.
316. Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Reducing Inequality - the Missing MDG: A Content Review of PRSPs
and Bilateral Donor Policy Statements, 41(1) IDS BULLETIN 26, 34 (2010).
317. See MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS: ROMANIA 14 (2010), available at
http://www.undg.org/docs/11956/MDGRomaniaProgressReport_2010.pdf; SOCIALIST
REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM, VIET NAM ACHIEVING THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS (2005)
available at http://www.undg.org/archive-docs/6623-Viet Nam FourthMDGReport.pdf;
although for indications of the human rights challenges facing ethnic and other minorities in
that country see REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT EXPERT ON MINORITY ISSUES, GAY MCDOUGALL,
ADDENDUM: MISSION TO VIETNAM (5-15 JULY 2010), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/45/Add. 2 Oan. 24,
2011), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/103/82/PDF/
G1110382.pdf?OpenElement.
318. Vandemoortele & Delamonica, supra note 15, at 64-67. Uruguay's social security target
(national Target 1.B), for example, prioritises progress in the lowest quintile. See Uruguay,
MDGs Report (Nov. 2010), available at http://www.undp.org/mdg/reports.shtml.
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the country and Argentina has established targets to reduce inter-provincial
inequality by ten percent for child mortality and maternal health goals. 319
The government of Kenya has set targets for each region in that country to
improve water and sanitation access by ten percent each year. And
Bangladesh has introduced targets corresponding to indicators for depth
and severity of income poverty. 320 Devising appropriate, reliable and cost-
effective methods to assess "affordability" of basic services across countries
should be taken up as part of this challenge.321
VI. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
The MDGs symbolise an unprecedented global partnership for poverty
reduction. Born in relative obscurity in the wake of the Millennium
Summit, the MDGs have exerted an impact on development discourse and
policy well beyond the expectations of their architects. Yet, on present
indications, they may well prove to be the world's biggest un-met promise.
It is essential to learn from the lessons of this experience as negotiations
towards the post-2015 development scenario gather momentum.
A new global deal is needed, rooted in ethics of universalism, equality,
solidarity and global social justice, and framed and buttressed by human
rights. The main barriers to realising the MDGs are deficits in political will,
rather than resources. The human rights framework can help to close the
accountability gap and strengthen incentives for action, mobilising
individuals and communities to demand the MDGs as a matter of right,
rather than charitable dispensation.
But can solidarity and enlightened self-interest trump parochialism and
short-run domestic political incentives? The 2015 negotiations will likely
occur in a more fractious and divided world compared with the millennial
moment that spawned the MDGs. The attacks on September 11, 2001
brought a new era of global insecurity in which human rights violations are
increasingly justified, by democratic and authoritarian regimes alike, in the
name of "freedom" and "stability." The financial, food, water and climate
crises have been among the other game-changers, imposing
disproportionate and unjust burdens upon the poorest populations (often
319. See Langford, supra note 48, at 86-87. The value of sub-national targeting is borne out
in UNDP's analysis of Thailand's MDGs progress, bringing out regional and other inequalities.
See Ellen Dorsey, Mayra G6mez, Bret Thiele & Paul Nelson, Falling Short of our Goals:
Transforming the Millennium Development Goals into Millennium Development Rights, 28(4) NETH.
HUM. Rs. Q. 516, 517 (2010).
320. Langford, supra note 48, at 86-87.
321. The Millennium Summit committed States to "halve the proportion of people who are
unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water," however the affordability element was
dropped by the U.N. expert group due to its lack of measurability. Vandemoortele, supra note
253, at 4. Recent work on affordability indexes based on household expenditures on water and
sanitation as a proportion of household income, with differential benchmarks for developing
and industrialised countries, might give inspiration to post-2015 MDG deliberations on this
issue, subject to more rigorous investigations into the validity and comparability of national
benchmarks, cross-subsidisation effects, and potentially viable proxy measures. See, e.g., HENRI
SMETs, DE L'EAU PORTABLE A UN PRIX ABORDABLE (2008).
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also in low-income countries), in a global scramble for scarce resources and
rising inequalities within and between countries. 322 The Arab Spring,
backed by the communications revolution, has heralded a welcome re-
affirmation of the universality of human rights aspirations while at the
same time generating brutal backlashes within and beyond the Arab
world.32 The "occupy" movements joined individuals across the globe in a
common struggle against corporate greed, social injustice and rising
inequalities. However,the most powerful source of identity for most people
remains the community and nation state rather than a putative global
polity. 324 These tensions, amid shifting configurations of geopolitical and
economic power, set an uncertain scene - at best - for negotiating a new
global compact against poverty. Holding the line on the 2010 MDGs
Summit commitment to "respect" international human rights law in MDG
policy should be a minimum requirement to ensure greater coherence
between human rights and development, trade, investment and
environment policy.
The MDGs have been driven by the power of numbers, and in a climate
of policy disagreement and mistrust the drive towards quantifiable and
reductive expressions of human progress will certainly continue. Debates
on the future of the MDGs will likely include revisiting the global
framework of goals, targets and indicators. Appropriately designed targets,
with adequate accountability mechanisms, can in principle strengthen
incentives for delivery on human rights obligations, as can league tables
which permit in-country and cross-country comparisons. Statistics, in turn,
play an indispensible role in informing evidence-based policymaking,
allowing measurement over time and space of the various inputs and
stimuli that guide, and impede, global human rights progress. Towards
2015, we should be talking more about how to measure what we treasure,
rather than treasure what we measure.
However there is a superficial allure in the "power of numbers" and
the promise of empirical verification. In the well-worn truism: "There are
three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics."325 Statistics have to
322. See, e.g., UNDP supra note 40, at 13-17; HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2006: BEYOND
SCARCITY: POWER, POVERTY AND THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS (2006).
323. See Hussein Agha & Robert O'Malley, The Arab Counterrevolution, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
Sept. 29-Oct. 12, 2011, at 42 (providing a more nuanced appraisal of the Arab Spring uprisings
than some of the more triumphalist accounts in mainstream Western media); see also GUY
STANDING, THE PRECARIAT: THE NEW DANGEROUS CLASS (2011) (for a provocative but prescient
analysis of some of the root causes of global disenfranchisement from the perspective of labour
market economics).
324. RODRIK, supra note 41, at 231, drawing from the World Values Survey databank at
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/services/index.html.
325. While this aphorism, popularised by Mark Twain, is frequently attributed to
Benjamin Disraeli, it has earlier provenance in an article by Leonard H. Courtney, Baron
Courtney of Penwith , To My Fellow-Disciples at Saratoga Springs, 26 THE NAT'L REV. 21-26, 25
(1895), available at http://www.york.ac.uk/depts/maths/histstat/courtney.pdf. The remark
was thereafter quoted in the Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. For further history, see
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"shoe-horn complex, moving phenomena into clear categories," with
varying degrees of correspondence to actual realities on the ground.326
Used uncritically, indicators - which are intended only to "indicate" - may
inadvertently supplant the objectives to be achieved. Contestable
assumptions and value judgements within statistical methods, and the
indicators industry in particular, should be brought to the surface and
challenged. Moreover, misconceived targets and "results-based
management" can distort development priorities, privileging short-term
quantifiable and reportable results over longer-run qualitative changes.327
For these reasons, deliberations towards a post-2015 global monitoring
framework cannot be de-linked from deeper questions about the values,
incentive structures and ideologies underpinning quantitative methods, as
well as those animating international development policy and institutions
more generally. 328
The world has moved on from the "global planners"' understanding of
development that, arguably, helped spawn the MDGs and their
predecessors, the International Development Goals. 329 Hence the post-2015
discussion needs to be first and foremost about basic values, as well as the
incentive systems and accountability structures that may stimulate human
rights realisation at the national level. We must also take careful stock of
why, as some have claimed, the MDGs have been misinterpreted or
misused. 330 Is genuine misunderstanding really at play, or could there also
have been conscious misappropriation in order, for example, to paper over
unpalatable truths and root causes of development problems? Or to justify
entrenched development orthodoxies and ideologies? Or to perpetuate
configurations of power under existing aid relationships? How can the
MDGs avoid being colonised by the aid and growth lobbies? How might it
be possible for the MDGs, and a post-2015 agreement, to operate in practice
as a servant for human rights, rather than as a master for extraneous
ideological or policy motives?
The aid lobby will no doubt be challenged to some extent by the
emerging research revealing the growing proportion of poor people living
in middle-income countries, demanding a more explicit focus on individuals
(rather than countries), inequalities, and distribution within countries, as
well as a reconceptualisation of the architecture and purposes of aid in
326. Ranil Dissanayake, Lies, Damned Lies and Distorting Normative Categorisation, AID
THOUGHTS WEB LOG, (Jan. 29, 2011), http://aidthoughts.org/?p=2036.
327. As Saith argued, "[i]nstitutionalising targets in bureaucracies and governmental
regimes usually invites misuse and manipulation of statistics and the misrepresentation of
outcomes." Supra note 20, at 1174.
328. Wade, supra note 41, at 686.
329. Duncan Green, From Power to Poverty, Oxfam Weblog, Nov. 3, 2011 available at
http://www.oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/?p=7409 (reviewing some of the main changes in
developing thinking and practice since the year 2000, including systems thinking, complexity
theory, and the diminishing role of aid, and the consequences that these have for a successor
global agreement to the MDGs).
330. Vandemoortele, supra note 19. Cf. Tabatabai, supra note 36 (arguing that poor design,
rather than innocent misunderstanding, is the problem). The literal transposition of global
goals and targets is said to be the principal manifestation of this "misunderstanding."
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different contexts in the medium to long term.331 Growth fetishists,
similarly, will be challenged to articulate the particular mechanisms
through which growth can yield inclusive and sustainable human
development outcomes in specific country contexts, given the mounting
evidence of the many possible proven pathways to development. 332 But the
vested interests behind these lobbies are formidable, and will likely be
marshalling at the MDG gates with renewed vigour towards 2015.
The international human rights framework can serve a vital purpose in
helping to ensure that the negotiations towards 2015 focus on legitimate
ends of human development, corresponding to internationally agreed upon
human rights norms, rather than context-specific and contested means. Any
successor global monitoring framework must include an explicit
understanding that "global" goals and targets have very specific and
limited, albeit important, purposes, to help raise the public consciousness
about important facets of human development and generate political will
and social mobilisation for action. National planning targets are quite a
different matter. This may not entirely eliminate wilful misapplication of
post-2015 global goals and targets, but it would at least deny the
perpetrators a ready excuse for doing so.
Finally, few policy debates will be of greater importance leading
towards 2015 than the debates about economic growth versus substantive
equality, and the conditions under which growth policies may best
contribute to inclusive, sustainable and pro-poor human development
goals. These debates are all the more pressing in the circumstances of
ongoing and compounding global crises discussed earlier in this Section.
Governments principally owe human rights obligations to their own
populations. In this respect, the growth of poverty and inequalities in
middle-income countries gives fresh impetus and relevance to the
international human rights framework. But the causes of poverty are not
always endogenous, even in middle-income countries. There are a myriad
ways in which good faith human rights implementation efforts continue to
be impeded by actions and omissions at the global level. Regulatory
failures in global finance, commodity market distortions, and the unfolding
calamity of climate change are among the most glaring examples. 333
The continued relevance and legitimacy of international human rights
law will depend, in great part, on the pace and extent to which it evolves to
331. ANDY SUMNER, THE NEW BOTTOM BILLION: WHAT IF MOST OF THE WORLD'S POOR LIVE
IN MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES? (2011), available at
http://www.ids.ac.uk/index.cfm?objectid=C605688-DAE8-991C-849CE712A60753EO. And as
Vandemoortele and Delamonica have argued, supra note 15, at 61: "[clompared with trade and
other financial flows, foreign aid is something of an overblown sideshow."
332. HDR 2010, supra note 21, at 45-64.
333. See, e.g., David Kinley & Mary Dowell-Jones, Minding the Gap: Global Finance and
Human Rights, 25 ETHICS & INTL AFF. 183 (2011); Report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the
right to food, Olivier de Schutter, Agribusiness and the right to food, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/33,
Dec. 22, 2009; Report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier de Schutter,
Crisis into Opportunity: Reinforcing Multilateralism, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/31, July 21, 2009;
Darrow et al., supra note 278.
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meet these existential challenges of global inter-dependence. This should
not be seen as a get-out-of-jail-free-card for governments in lower income
countries, which are governed under international human rights law by a
specific set of obligations of conduct and result that only partially depend
upon international cooperation. Unlike many other international legal
regimes, the human rights treaty regime is not a reciprocal one in the sense
that a given state's obligations are contingent upon the performance of
others. Nevertheless, to the extent that the causes of poverty are exogenous,
richer countries will have fewer and fewer excuses to avoid binding and
appropriately calibrated commitments for more effective global cooperation
under human rights treaties and post-2015 global partnership
arrangements. Whether the MDGs' successors are a milestone towards
global social justice, or a millstone around the necks of the poorest, will
depend upon the degree to which governments of richer and poorer
countries alike can be held accountable for their human rights obligations.
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